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NOTES
PTO RULEMAKING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: DEFINING THE LINE BETWEEN




The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)' is currently "under
siege." 2  It is combating a seemingly insurmountable backlog of
unexamined patent applications 3 and ever-increasing application pendency. 4
Despite efforts to increase examination efficiency, 5 conditions at the PTO
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law. Patent Agent, Ropes & Gray
LLP. I would like to thank Professor Susan Scafidi for her valuable feedback and guidance
throughout the note-writing process.
1. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is a federal administrative agency of
the U.S. Department of Commerce responsible for the examination and issuance of U.S.
patents and trademarks. See Herbert F. Schwartz, Patent Law and Practice 10-11 (3d ed.
2001); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Our Business: An Introduction to the USPTO,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/intro.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
2. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, The 21st Century Strategic Plan 1 (2003),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2l/stratplan_03feb2003.pdf
[hereinafter Strategic Plan]; see also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim Adjustments
to the 21st Century Strategic Plan 6 (2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/comp/budg/iad-strat.pdf (outlining changes to the
PTO's performance targets due to "the doubling of the number of patent applications filed
since 1992, the increased technical complexity of patent applications, and the growth in the
backlog of applications awaiting a patent examiner's first review").
3. See Strategic Plan, supra note 2, at 1; see also Changes to Practice for Continuing
Applications, Requests for Continued Examination Practice, and Applications Containing
Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48, 49 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (noting the PTO's backlog).
4. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report for
Fiscal Year 2005, at 22-23 (2005), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/
annual/2005/2005annualreport.pdf. Total application pendency is the length of time an
application is pending at the PTO before abandonment or issuance.
5. For example, the PTO hired a record 1218 new patent examiners in 2006. See U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006, at 4
(2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/2006
annualreport.pdf [hereinafter Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006].
The PTO has also launched an electronic patent application filing system that has been met
with approval by patent applicants. See id. at 18 (noting that the PTO exceeded its goal of
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are not improving: The time before which an applicant receives a first
Office Action6 has increased every year since 2000, 7 and total application
pendency has increased every year since 2002.8 Today, a typical patent
applicant can expect to wait almost two years before receiving an initial
examination of a patent application. 9
To be sure, the PTO's current predicament is not the result of endemic
mismanagement or lack of effective leadership; rather, it is largely the result
of booming business at the PTO. New application filings increased nearly
twenty-five percent between 2003 and 2006,10 with a significant portion of
these filings originating from foreign applicants." In fact, due to the
burgeoning number of new patent application filings, the operation of the
PTO is actually a profitable business for the United States. 12 The PTO has
been self-sufficient since 1991, capable of deriving its entire operating
budget from applicant fee revenue, and even saw a surplus of over $545
million between fiscal year (FY) 1991 and 2004,13 and a net income of over
$80 million in FY 2006 alone. 14 Foreign patent applicants are increasingly
seeking patent protection in the United States because of today's global
economy; this has, at least in part, led to the influx of new filings. 15 In
addition, a rash of large patent settlements and jury awards in recent U.S.
new electronic patent application filings in 2006); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
Electronic Filing System Help, http://www.uspto.gov/ebc/efshelp.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2007).
6. An Office Action is an official communication from the PTO setting forth the patent
examiner's arguments regarding the patentability of an applicant's claims. See generally
Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technology Age 159-64 (4th ed.
2006); infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
7. See Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006, supra note 5, at 21-
22; U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year
2003, at 19 (2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/comI/annual/2003/2003
annualreport.pdf [hereinafter Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2003].
8. See Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006, supra note 5, at 22;
Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2003, supra note 7, at 19.
9. The time to first Office Action averaged 22.6 months in fiscal year 2006. See
Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006, supra note 5, at 70.
10. Id. at 62.
11. Over forty-five percent of all patent applications filed in 2005 were filed by foreign
residents. See id. at 126, 128-29 (dividing the number of patent applications filed by foreign
residents by the number of total applications filed).
12. See Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (analyzing PTO
patent fee appropriations).
13. See id. Interestingly, at least one patent applicant challenged the use of patent
application fees to fund federal programs outside the PTO. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit held that PTO fees can be constitutionally applied to other federal
programs. Id. at 1025-26.
14. See Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006, supra note 5, at 78.
15. For an analysis of who is obtaining patents in what industries, see John R. Allison &
Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution,
53 Vand. L. Rev. 2099 (2000).
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patent enforcement actions has enticed both foreign and domestic applicants
to procure U.S. patent protection.' 6
The rush to file new patent applications in the United States accounts for
only part of the PTO's "workload crisis."' 17 According to the PTO, the
subject matter of new patent applications is growing increasingly technical
and complex, 18 especially in the fields of biotechnology, electronics, and
computer software. The esoteric nature of these applications sometimes
requires patent examiners to perform an extensive review of background
literature before they can effectively tackle an application and issue a first
Office Action. In addition, the PTO has adopted various internal quality
control procedures that have affected total application pendency. For
example, to help improve patent quality, the PTO has implemented a
widespread "second pair of eyes" review policy before patent issuance.' 9
The PTO adopted this quality control procedure partly in response to
applicant demands for patent claims with a higher likelihood of validity
during the enforcement process. 20
Although the PTO's efforts to improve patent quality are admirable and
arguably much needed, these efforts have not increased application
examination efficiency. The rate of new application filings continues to
outpace the rate at which the PTO examines new applications. 2 1 As a
result, the PTO sees itself moving away, not toward, its twenty-first century
Strategic Plan goal22 of controlling application pendency and expediting the
patent prosecution 23 process.
To help reduce application pendency and improve the overall plight at
the Patent Office, the PTO recently proposed two new rules24 designed to
16. The largest patent enforcement settlement tops $1.3 billion. See Marius Meland, IP
Litigation Yielded $3.4B in 2006: Survey, IP Law 360, Dec. 29, 2006,
http://ip.law360.com/Secure/ViewArticle.aspx?id=15579 (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). There
are, of course, other economic reasons for obtaining patent protection. For example, venture
capitalists often look for issued patents or pending patent applications when valuing (and
funding) a start-up. See generally Norman Carte, Patent Valuation: The Maximum
Achievable Profits Method, Intell. Prop. Today, May, 2005, at 32.
17. See Strategic Plan, supra note 2, at 1.
18. Id.
19. The second pair of eyes review includes a second review of claims before issuance
by another person, typically a primary or supervisory patent examiner. See id. at 9; John R.
Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 987,
995 (2003).
20. The PTO actively monitors patent and trademark litigation activity. See Performance
and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006, supra note 5, at 147.
21. See Strategic Plan, supra note 2, at 5.
22. See id.
23. Patent prosecution is the general term for the interaction between patent applicants
(or their representatives) and the PTO. It includes the filing of a patent application and the
back-and-forth process of receiving and replying to official communications from the PTO.
See generally U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ch.
700 (8th ed. 2006) [hereinafter MPEP].
24. Although this Note refers to each rule in the singular as either the "continuing
application rule" or the "claim designation rule," each rule actually proposes to amend
multiple sections of title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). See Changes to
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help the PTO meet its productivity goals. 25 . The new rules propose to
amend various sections of title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.) to limit an applicant's ability to file continuing applications26 and
to obtain a complete examination of the claims 27 of a patent application.
The rules, if adopted, would represent a radical shift in the PTO's long-
standing practice of allowing applicants to determine the strength and scope
of patent protection for their inventions. 28  The new rules are also
significant because they test the limits of the PTO's rulemaking authority. 29
Although there has been limited support for the new rules, 30 most
contend that the rules, if adopted, would hinder patent applicants from
obtaining comprehensive patent protection.31 Many also argue that the new
rules would persuade patent applicants to reassess the viability of patents as
an adequate form of intellectual property protection and to consider
alternate forms of protection. 32 Some commentators have even questioned
the PTO's statutory authority to promulgate the new rules. 33
This Note analyzes the bounds of the PTO's rulemaking authority and the
validity of the two rules proposed by the PTO on January 3, 2006. 34 In
order to thoroughly assess the validity of these new rules, Part I of this Note
Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Examination Practice, and
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48 (proposed Jan. 3,
2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (continuing application rule); Changes to Practice
for the Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61 (proposed Jan. 3,
2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (claim designation rule).
25. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Proposes Measures to
Improve Patent Examination (Jan. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/06-0 1 .htm.
26. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
27. The claims of a patent application define the "metes and bounds" of the subject
matter that will be protected by the patent grant. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
28. See generally infra Part I.A.
29. See infra Part II.
30. Of the comments submitted to the PTO in response to the notice of proposed
rulemaking from organizations, agencies, corporations, associations, and law firms, only a
handful are in favor of the proposed rules. See generally U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
Comments Regarding Continuation Practice, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/
opla/comments/fpp-continuation/continuationcomments.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)
(collecting public comments submitted to the PTO regarding the proposed continuing
application rule); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Comments Regarding Claims Practice,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/fpp-claims/claims-comments.ht
ml (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) (collecting public comments submitted to the PTO regarding
the proposed claim designation rule).
31. The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) presents a typical
argument along these lines. See Letter from Michael K. Kirk, Executive Dir., AIPLA, to the
Honorable Jon Dudas, Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. & Dir. of the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office (Apr. 24, 2006) [hereinafter AIPLA Continuation Comments],
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/fpp-continuation/
aipla.pdf; infra Part III.C.
32. For example, trade secrets may become a more attractive option. For a comparison
of the available types of intellectual property protection, see Merges et al., supra note 6, at
24-30.
33. See, e.g., AIPLA Continuation Comments, supra note 31, at 6-8.
34. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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lays the necessary foundation for distinguishing between valid and invalid
PTO rules.
Part II analyzes the debate surrounding the PTO's statutory authority to
adopt the proposed continuing application rule and the claim designation
rule. It presents the arguments of the proponents of the new rules, 35 who
feel the rules are both necessary and squarely within the PTO's statutory
authority to adopt, as well as the arguments of the opponents of the new
rules,36 who feel the rules are "troubling 37 and overreaching.
Part III of this Note suggests a framework for delineating between valid
and invalid PTO rulemaking. This part also argues that the PTO will
exceed its congressional grant of rulemaking authority in adopting at least
one of the new rules. This Note concludes with some potential alternatives
to the rules that might increase examination efficiency at the PTO.
I. THE HISTORY OF PTO RULEMAKING AND THE OFFICE'S RULEMAKING
AUTHORITY
The PTO has a rich legislative rulemaking history that stretches back
over 165 years. 38 PTO rules have historically dictated the manner of
applicant interaction with the PTO in order to procure a patent.39 To
understand how a patent application matures into a patent, Part L.A presents
a brief primer on the patent application filing and prosecution 40 processes.
Part I.B then details the new continuing application and claim designation
rules and their effect on patent applicants. To thoroughly analyze the
validity of the new rules, Part I.C traces the development of the PTO's
statutory authority to promulgate rules, and Part I.D highlights selected
PTO rulemaking at various stages throughout the PTO's rulemaking
history. Part I.E then analyzes the effect of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) on PTO rulemaking. Finally, Part I.F outlines some limits on
PTO rulemaking due to both the language of the PTO's statutory
rulemaking grant and the APA's judicial review provisions.
A. Anatomy of the Patent Prosecution Process
A patent applicant must satisfy several requirements before the PTO will
award the applicant a patent.41 The process begins with the applicant42
35. According to the published comments on the proposed rulemaking, the proponents
of the new rules are limited to the PTO and a handful of applicants and organizations. See
supra note 30.
36. Opponents include the overwhelming majority of applicants, law firms, and
organizations. See supra note 30.
37. Kirk, AIPLA Continuation Comments, supra note 31, at 3.
38. The PTO's first express rulemaking authority appeared in the Act of 1839. See infra
notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 23.
41. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
2109
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
preparing and filing a patent application, which is a formal document
describing the applicant's invention. 43 The patent application typically
includes several sections of text, called the specification, and at least one
drawing referenced within the specification.44 The application concludes
with a series of numbered noun phrases, called claims, that define the
"metes and bounds" of the applicant's invention.45 The claims of a patent
application also define the extent of protection conferred by the patent
grant, if and when the application matures into a patent. For example, to
prove infringement 46 of a patent, the current owner of a patent typically
must show that an accused device "embodies every limitation" of at least
one issued claim.47
Patent application claims are either independent'8 or dependent.49
Independent claims stand on their own and do not reference other claims in
the patent application. 50 Dependent claims "refer[] back to and further
limit[] another claim or claims in the same application."' 5 1 The PTO
construes dependent claims as including all of the limitations of any claims
they reference. 52
Under current PTO practice, an applicant is generally free to determine
the number of claims presented in a patent application. 53 The PTO does,
however, charge a claim surcharge for each independent claim presented in
a patent application in excess of three and for each total claim presented in
excess of twenty. 54  Provided that the applicant pays the appropriate
surcharges, the PTO examines all the claims in the application, or restricts a
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.").
42. More precisely, the applicant's representative (e.g., a registered patent practitioner)
typically prepares and files the patent application on the applicant's behalf. See generally
MPEP, supra note 23, at ch. 400; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 10-11.
43. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 12-16.
44. See id.
45. See Robert C. Faber, Landis on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting § 4 (4th ed.
1999); MPEP, supra note 23, § 2171.
46. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 131-53.
47. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
see also Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821-22 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
48. See Faber, supra note 45, § I IA.
49. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(c) (2006); Faber, supra note 45, § 11.
50. For example, an independent claim might read as follows: "I. A widget comprising
A, B, and C." A dependent claim in the same application might then read as follows: "2.
The widget of claim 1 further comprising D." See Faber, supra note 45, § 11.
51. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(c).
52. See id. ("Claims in dependent form shall be construed to include all the limitations
of the claim incorporated by reference into the dependent claim.").
53. See Faber, supra note 45, §§ 60-62. But see 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(b) ("More than one
claim may be presented provided they differ substantially from each other and are not unduly
multiplied.").
54. Excess claim fees have risen sharply in recent years. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(h)
(independent claims in excess of three); id. § 1.16(i) (total claims in excess of twenty).
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subset of the claims out of the application, if the claims recite more than
one "independent or distinct" invention. 55
An applicant files a patent application in the PTO with the required filing
fees 56 and other formal filing documents.57 The PTO then accords the
application a filing date 58 and queues the application for examination.
After some time,59 a patent examiner will review, or examine, the patent
application and its claims. The examiner will also perform an extensive
search of the relevant prior art, which includes patent application
publications, 60 issued patents, and other printed publications61 accessible to
the interested public prior to the effective filing date62 of the patent
application being examined. 63
After a review of the prior art, the patent examiner may reject one or
more claims in the patent application as failing to meet the standards of
patentability recited in the patent statute. 64  The main pitfalls to
patentability lie in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, which require that the
applicant's claimed invention be both novel 65 and nonobvious 66 over the
prior art. After a review of the patent application's claims and the available
prior art, the patent examiner will typically issue a first official
communication, called an Office Action, rejecting one or more of the patent
55. Restriction practice requires the applicant to elect a single invention for examination
and pursue the unelected invention or inventions in one or more continuing applications,
usually one or more divisional applications. See MPEP, supra note 23, §§ 201.06, 803.
56. The current basic filing, search, and examination fees total $1000 ($500 for small
entities). See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, FY 2007 Fee Schedule,
http://www.uspto.gov/go/fees/fee2007february01.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) [hereinafter
FY 2007 Fee Schedule].
57. The formal filing documents include an oath by the applicant that the applicant
believes he or she is "the original and first inventor" of the subject matter for which a patent
is sought. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115 (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53; MPEP, supra note 23, § 506.
58. The application filing date is important because it determines the reference date used
to discover "prior" art. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
59. On average, an applicant waits 22.6 months before initial examination of his or her
patent application. See supra note 9.
60. The PTO normally publishes patent applications eighteen months from the earliest
effective filing date. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b).
61. The term printed publication is expansive and includes websites and other
electronically published documents. See generally MPEP, supra note 23, § 2128 ("A
reference is proven to be a 'printed publication' 'upon a satisfactory showing that such
document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons
interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence,
can locate it."' (quoting In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981))).
62. An application's effective filing date takes into account any benefit claims to certain
prior, related applications. See id. § 706.02(V).
63. For the different types of prior art, see generally id. ch. 900.
64. See generally Schwartz, supra note 1, at 61 ("For an invention to be patentable, it
must be (1) of patentable subject matter, (2) useful, (3) new, and (4) nonobvious.").
65. Novelty requires that an applicant's invention be not "known or used by others in
this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country,
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent." 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
66. The applicant's "subject matter as a whole" cannot be obvious to one having
"ordinary skill in the art." Id. § 103(a).
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application's claims. 67 The applicant may then reply to the Office Action
by amending 68 the claims of the patent application to distinguish the
applicant's claimed invention from the prior art cited in the Office Action.69
Alternatively, the applicant may leave the claims as is and argue that the
examiner has misconstrued the prior art or the applicant's claims. 70
If the examiner agrees with the applicant, the PTO will issue a Notice of
Allowance 71 and eventually a patent covering the claims of the patent
application. 72 If the applicant's arguments are not convincing, however,
then the examiner may issue a second, "final" Office Action.73 After the
PTO issues a final Office Action, prosecution of the application is officially
closed, and further amendments to the application's claims are no longer
allowed as a matter of right. 74 The applicant may, nevertheless, attempt to
convince the examiner one more time that the claims in the patent
application satisfy the requirements of the patent statute. 75 Thus, a patent
applicant is said to receive "two bites" at obtaining a patent. If at any time
the applicant fails to reply to an Office Action within the required time
period,76 the application becomes abandoned.7 7
In a typical patent application filing cycle, an applicant first files an
initial application directed to the core aspect of the applicant's invention.
The applicant then prosecutes this initial application to abandonment or
patenting. At anytime before abandonment or patenting, the applicant may
file one or more "continuing" applications 78 directed to another (or the
same) aspect of the invention. The PTO accords these "child" continuing
applications an effective filing date equal to the filing date of the "parent"
application for prior art purposes; 79 however, the PTO measures the term of
any patent issuing from a continuing application from the filing date of the
earliest parent application. 80
67. See MPEP, supra note 23, § 706.
68. Amendments to an application are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.121. See id. § 714.
69. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111 (2006); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 20-21.
70. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b).
71. See MPEP, supra note 23, § 1303.
72. See id. § 1309; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 21-22.
73. See MPEP, supra note 23, § 706.07.
74. See id. §§ 714.12-.13; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 22-26.
75. The applicant may file a reply to the final Office Action with or without an
amendment. See MPEP, supra note 23, §§ 714.12-.13.
76. Generally, an Office Action sets a three-month shortened statutory time period to
reply. See id. § 710.02(b).
77. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.135 (2006); MPEP, supra note 23, § 711.
78. Continuing applications include divisional, continuation, and continuation-in-part
applications. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 24-26; MPEP, supra note 23, § 201.06
(divisional applications); id. § 201.07 (continuation applications); id. § 201.08 (continuation-
in-part applications).
79. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000); supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
80. The patent term is twenty years from the filing date of the earliest prior-filed
application whose benefit is claimed under 35 U.S.C. § 120, 121, or 365(c). See 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(2); MPEP, supra note 23, § 2701.
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In lieu of, or in addition to, filing a continuing application, if an applicant
is unsuccessful in convincing the patent examiner that the claims of the
patent application meet the requirements of the patent statute, 8 1 the
applicant may file a request for continued examination (RCE).82 After
filing the request, the finality of the last Office Action is withdrawn, and the
PTO permits the applicant another "two bites" at convincing the examiner
that the application's claims are patentable. 8 3 The RCE process may
continue indefinitely, so long as the applicant pays the requisite fees and
meets the other procedural requirements. 84 Thus, the PTO presently allows
a determined applicant to prosecute a patent application indefinitely so long
as the applicant "advance[s] prosecution. '85
B. The New Proposed Rules
This section details the two new rules recently proposed by the PTO.
Part I.B. 1 describes the new continuing application rule, and Part I.B.2
explains the new claim designation rule. The proposed rules represent a
significant shift in the flexibility patent applicants currently enjoy in
determining the desired scope of their patent protection. The PTO may not
adopt either of the new rules without thirty days advance notice.8 6
1. Imposing Limits on Continuing Applications
The first new rule proposed by the PTO would drastically alter the
current practice of filing continuing applications and requests for continued
examination. 87 It would require that "second or subsequent continued
examination filings, whether a continuation.., or a request for continued
examination" 88 be accompanied by a showing that the amendment,
argument, or evidence submitted with the continued examination filing
could not have been submitted to the Office before prosecution in the prior
application closed.89  The applicant's showing that the amendment,
argument, or evidence could not have been previously submitted must come
in the form of a petition with a required petition fee. 90
81. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (listing the requirements for patentability).
82. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(b); 37 C.F.R. § 1.114.
83. See MPEP, supra note 23, § 706.07(h).
84. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.114; MPEP, supra note 23, § 706.07(h).
85. See In re Bogese II, 303 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that an applicant
forfeited a patent application for an unreasonably lengthy prosecution with no attempt
substantively to advance prosecution); infra note 281 and accompanying text.
86. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Proposed Rule Changes to Focus the Patent
Practice in the 21st Century, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/presentation/
focuspp.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
87. See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued
Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. 48, 48 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 48-52.
90. Id. at 53-54.
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If the applicant cannot make the appropriate showing, the Office will
"refuse to enter, or will delete if present" any reference to the earlier
application in the continuing application. 91 This refusal would strip the
continuing application of the benefit of the earlier-filed application's filing
date, allowing the earlier-filed application to be used as prior art against the
later-filed continuing application. 92 It would also serve as an effective bar
to the second application ever maturing into a patent.
It has been noted that "[o]ne of the oddest things about the United States
patent system" is the impossibility of "ever finally reject[ing] a patent
application. '93 This result is due to the lack of any limit on the number of
continuing applications or requests for continued examination an applicant
may file. 94 Although this practice allows patent applicants to maximize the
potential of their patent applications, the undesirability of this arrangement,
as well as its potential for abuse, abounds.95
2. Designating Representative Claims for Examination
The second rule proposed by the PTO restricts the ability of applicants to
receive initial examination of all the claims in a patent application. 96 The
claim designation rule proposes to amend title 37 of the C.F.R. to require
applicants to designate ten representative claims in each patent application
for initial examination. 97 The representative claims would include all
independent claims and any dependent claims expressly elected by the
applicant.98  The PTO would then only examine the designated
representative claims and defer examination of the remaining claims until
the application is otherwise in condition for allowance.99
If the applicant desires to have more than ten representative claims
examined, the new rule requires the applicant to "share the burden" of
91. Id. at 54.
92. Since the applications would generally contain the same disclosure, any claims
supported by the disclosure of the later-filed application would be anticipated by the
disclosure of the earlier-filed application, eliminating the possibility of any patentable
claims.
93. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84
B.U. L. Rev. 63, 64 (2004).
94. More precisely, an applicant may file continuing applications or requests for
continued examination until the patent term expires, provided that an application is still
pending at this time and the other procedural requirements are met. See MPEP, supra note
23, §§ 201.07, 2701.
95. For examples of the undesirable results of the unlimited continuation practice, see
Lemley & Moore, supra note 93, at 71-83.
96. See Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 71
Fed. Reg. 61, 61 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 62 ("[T]he Office is proposing to delay the patentability examination of most
dependent claims until the application is otherwise in condition for allowance. The Office,
however, will examine every claim in an application before issuing a patent on the
application.").
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examining the excess claims by providing an examination support
document (ESD) covering all the designated claims. 10 0 The ESD would
include a statement by the applicant that a pre-examination search was
conducted and a listing of pertinent references resulting from the search.' 0 '
3. The Interplay Between the Two Proposed Rules
Although each of the two proposed rules represents a radical shift in the
filing and examination procedure for patent applications, the combination
of the rules has an additional impact on some applicants. By limiting both
the number of continuing applications and the number of claims in each
application, the total number of claims directed toward a particular
invention is capped.' 0 2 Some applicants may be unable to adequately claim
their inventions with such a small, fixed number of claims.10 3
In addition, the proposed continuing application rule creates a
presumption that two or more patent applications contain "patentably
indistinct" claims if the following are true: (1) The applications have the
same effective filing dates; (2) the applications name at least one inventor in
common, are owned by the same person, or are subject to an obligation of
assignment to the same person; and (3) the applications contain
substantially overlapping specifications. 104 The proposed claim designation
rule, however, specifies that all patentably indistinct claims will be counted




101. The examination support document (ESD) would also include "an identification of
all the limitations of the independent claims and designated dependent claims that are
disclosed by the references cited." Id. at 65.
102. The number of claims is limited only if the applicant does not wish to provide an
ESD. For example, a single invention could have, at most, twenty independent claims-ten
in the first application and ten in the single permitted continuing application. Distinct
inventions, however, may be subject to a restriction requirement, and an applicant may file a
divisional application for each such distinct invention. Each divisional application may then
be eligible for a single continuing application. See Changes to Practice for Continuing
Applications, Requests for Continued Examination Practice, and Applications Containing
Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48, 53 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
103. Another observation made primarily by biotech firms is that the new rules limit an
applicant's ability to present claims in a continuing application that cover new uses of the
invention. See, e.g., Laura Cutland, Patent Rule Irks Bio Firms, Silicon Valley/San Jose Bus.
J., Jan. 20, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/sanjose/stories/2006/01/23/
story2.html.
104. See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued
Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 55.
105. See Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 71
Fed. Reg. at 64 ("[I]f the patentably indistinct claims are not eliminated from all but one of
the nonprovisional applications, the Office will treat the independent claims and the
dependent claims designated for initial examination in the first nonprovisional application
and in each of such other nonprovisional applications or patents as present in each of the
nonprovisional applications.").
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As a result, in addition to allowing only a single continuing application,
the new rules would also prevent applicants from "splitting" an omnibus
application, or filing multiple applications with identical disclosures on the
same day directed toward different aspects of the applicant's invention.
Assuming applicants would not want to make assertions about the prior art
on the record for fear of inequitable conduct, 10 6 the combined effect of the
two proposed rules may be to dramatically limit an applicant's ability to
receive comprehensive patent protection, particularly for complex,
multifaceted inventions. Since the two new rules would radically revise the
long-standing procedure for filing new patent applications in the United
States, it is helpful to outline a brief history of the PTO's rulemaking
authority.
C. The Development of the PTO's Rulemaking Authority
1. The Act of 1839: PTO Rulemaking Beginnings
Forty-nine years after Congress enacted the first federal patent statute,
Congress expressly granted the Commissioner of Patents his first
rulemaking power.10 7 The Act of 1839 provided "[t]hat the Commissioner
of Patents shall have power to make all such regulations in respect to the
taking of evidence to be used in contested cases before him, as may be just
and reasonable."' 0 8 Although this rulemaking provision in the Act of 1839
does not resemble the PTO's current rulemaking authority, it is important to
note that the Commissioner once wielded extremely restricted rulemaking
power limited exclusively to evidence gathering.
Congress slightly enlarged the Commissioner's rulemaking power in the
Act of 1861.109 Specifically, Congress granted the Commissioner the
authority to "establish rules for taking affidavits and depositions required in
cases pending in the Patent Office" and to govern a board of examiners-in-
106. Inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense to patent infringement that can result
from failing to disclose pertinent information to the PTO during the patent prosecution
process. Questions of inequitable conduct may also be raised from misleading or false
statements made to the PTO. For an overview of the inequitable conduct defense and its
effect on the U.S. patent system, see Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to
Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 147 (2006).
The possibility of creating an inequitable conduct defense was a common worry among
applicants who commented on the new rules. See, e.g., Letter from Michael K. Kirk,
Executive Director, AIPLA, to Honorable Jon Dudas, Under Sec'y of Commerce for
Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO 14 (Apr. 24, 2006) [hereinafter AIPLA
Claims Comments], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments
/fppclaims/aipla.pdf ("[T]his requirement [to submit an ESD] makes the applicant an easy
target for an inequitable conduct charge in an enforcement action.").
107. The first federal patent statute was enacted in 1790. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7,
1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793). Although the "Commissioner" was initially entrusted with the
PTO's statutory rulemaking power, the current rulemaking authority is granted to the
"Office." See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2000).
108. Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 12, 5 Stat. 353 (repealed 1861).
109. See Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 1, 12 Stat. 246 (repealed 1870).
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chief by "the rules to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Patents."1 10
Although the Commissioner enjoyed slightly greater rulemaking power
under the Act of 1861, the bounds of his rulemaking authority were still
well-defined.
2. The Act of 1870: The Precursor to the Patent Act of 1952
The Commissioner's rulemaking power remained fairly unaltered until
1870, when Congress granted the Commissioner sweeping authority to
"establish rules and regulations ... for the conduct of proceedings in the
patent office."' II1 This statutory authorization, however, was subject to an
important caveat: Any rule or regulation the Commissioner established
under this provision was required to be "not inconsistent with law." 12
The language of the PTO's current rulemaking authority is very similar
to that of the 1870 statute; 113 therefore, an analysis of the legislative history
of the 1870 statute is essential to determine the congressional intent behind
the rulemaking authority enjoyed by the PTO today. Unfortunately,
however, the legislative history of the 1870 statute is "meager."' '114 What is
gleaned from the legislative history is that Congress intended to enlarge the
PTO's rulemaking power with the 1870 statute;' 15 however, as evidenced
from a discussion on the floor of the House, the rulemaking powers were
exclusively intended "to apply to the proceedings in the Patent Office" and,
more particularly, for the purpose of "regulating the manner in which
proceedings [before the Office] shall be conducted. 11 6
3. The Patent Act of 1952: Congress Grants the PTO Sweeping
Rulemaking Authority
The Patent Act of 1952 codified many of the PTO's procedures for
examining and issuing patents. 117  The specific "duties" of the PTO
Commissioner, including his rulemaking powers, were codified in 35
U.S.C. § 6.118 Although the Patent Act of 1952 cosmetically modified the
language of the Commissioner's rulemaking power, "there is no evidence
110. Id. §§ 1-2; see also Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaking Power of the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (pt. 1), 64 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 490, 493 (1982).
111. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 19, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1909).
112. Id.
113. Compare id. (granting the power to "establish rules and regulations.., for the
conduct of proceedings in the patent office"), with 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2000) (granting
the power to "establish regulations ... which shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the
Office").
114. Wamsley, supra note 110, at 494.
115. Id. ("[T]he Commissioner was being given some new authority [in the 1870 statute]
to establish rules that he had not previously possessed .... ").
116. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2856 (1870); Wamsley, supra note 110, at 495-
96.





any change in substance [from the 1870 statute] was intended."'1 9 The
PTO's main statutory authority for rulemaking today lies in 35 U.S.C.
§ 2(a)(2), 120 which grants the PTO the ability to "establish regulations, not
inconsistent with law, which ... shall govern the conduct of proceedings in
the Office."12'
Congress's choice of expansive language in this rulemaking provision
bestows "broad powers" on the PTO to establish rules.' 22 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has even described this statutory
provision as a "general congressional grant of authority."'123 As described
in Part I.F, however, there are significant limitations to the PTO's
rulemaking authority. 124
D. Early Questions of the PTO's Rulemaking Authority
The PTO has tested the bounds of its rulemaking authority before. 125
Part I.D. 1 summarizes PTO rulemaking from 1839, after the Commissioner
received his first rulemaking authority, to 1977. Part I.D.2 describes the
bold use of the PTO's rulemaking authority in enacting the "Dann
Amendments" of 1977. Part I.D.3 discusses the repeal of the 1977
amendments and selected contemporary rulemaking.
1. Innocuous Rulemaking from 1839 to 1977
As one of the oldest administrative agencies in the United States, 126 the
PTO is no stranger to rulemaking. The Commissioner of the PTO began
developing "crude rules of practice"' 127 even before he had the express
authority to do so.128 Although the earliest PTO rules related primarily to
119. Wamlsey, supra note 110, at 497 & n. 19. The rulemaking provision was changed
from "[tihat the commissioner, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, may
from time to time establish rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct
of proceedings in the patent office" to "[the commissioner] may, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Commerce, establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct
of proceedings in the Patent Office." Compare Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 19, 16 Stat.
198 (repealed 1909), with Act of July 19, 1952, § 6.
120. The PTO's main rulemaking authority was moved from 35 U.S.C. § 6 to 35 U.S.C.
§ 2 by the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA). See American Inventors
Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4712, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2000).
122. Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (upholding PTO rule
662(b) requiring a patentee who has filed a reissue application after the close of the
preliminary motions period of an interference proceeding to file a belated preliminary
motion adding the application to the interference proceeding).
123. Id. at 1529.
124. See infra Part I.F.
125. See, e.g., infra Part I.D.2.
126. See Peter J. Corcoran 11, Administrative Procedure Act Standards Governing
Judicial Review of Findings of Fact Made by the Patent and Trademark Office, 7 Rich. J.L.
& Tech. 1, 1 & n. 1 (2000), available at http://law.ichmond.edu/jolt/v7i l/articlel.html.
127. Wamsley, supra note 110, at 499.
128. The Commissioner received the statutory authority to make rules in 1870. See id.
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the format for submitting applications to the Office and the requisite fees
for examination, 129 later rules began to "restate[] and interpret[]" the patent
statute and judicial holdings relating to the patent statute.' 30  After the
Federal Register Act was amended in 1937 to provide for codification of
administrative regulations,131 the PTO regularly codified its new rules in
the C.F.R.
Perhaps the greatest influence on the format, structure, and readability of
the PTO rules was the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in
1946.132 Partly in response to the Administrative Procedure Act and partly
in response to internal reorganization, the Patent Office issued a major
revision to the PTO rules in 1949.133 Although the 1949 rules did not
attempt to interpret the statutory requirements for patentability, for the first
time the rules did impose new obligations on patent applicants-obligations
that were not mandated by statute. As such, the 1949 rules represented an
important shift in the purpose and function of PTO rules: The rules moved
from expounding the procedures for interacting with the Patent Office to
detailing the quid pro quo of the patent prosecution process. For example,
Rule 65 of the 1949 rules required applicants to submit an oath regarding
public use and prior sale of the invention in the United States before the
PTO would accept an application for examination.' 34 Although the 1949
rule revision began to test the bounds of the Commissioner's rulemaking
authority, the 1949 rules were modest compared to the rules adopted in
1977.
2. The 1977 Dann Amendments
The PTO's "most far reaching' 35 use of rulemaking power was
embodied in the Dann Amendments of 1977.136 These rules established
new procedures for reexamining 137 patents through the use of the reissue
129. Id. at 500.
130. Id. For example, PTO Rule 56 attempted to define the standard for fraud on the
PTO. See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
131. Act of June 19, 1937, ch. 369, § 11, 50 Stat. 304, 304-05 (codified as amended at 44
U.S.C. § 1510 (2000)).
132. The Administrative Procedure Act governs, among other things, the way in which
administrative agencies in the United States promulgate new rules. See generally Tom C.
Clark, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act (1947). For an analysis of the effect the Administrative
Procedure Act had on PTO rules, see generally Casper W. Ooms, The United States Patent
Office and the Administrative Procedure Act, 38 Trademark Rep. 149 (1948).
133. See Wamsley, supra note 110, at 501-03.
134. Id. at 502-03.
135. Id. at 512.
136. The Dann Amendments were proposed by Commissioner C. Marshall Dann, the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks from 1974 to 1977. See id.
137. A reexamination is just that-another chance for the patent examiner to examine an
applicant's claims. See MPEP, supra note 23, § 2209 (discussing ex parte reexamination).
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process 138 and changed several existing patent examining procedures.
Although the patent community met the 1977 rules with overwhelming
support,' 39  some commentators questioned the authority of the
Commissioner to adopt at least one of the 1977 rules.' 40 For example, the
1977 rules amended Rule 175 to provide for a reexamination of claims in an
issued patent through a reissue application (what later came to be known as
the "no-defect"' 141 reissue). 142 All that was required in order for an
applicant to invoke the new procedure was "prior art or other
information... which might cause the examiner to deem the original
patent... invalid.' 43 This rule revision was a major "reinterpretation" of
35 U.S.C. § 251, which, at the time, provided only for the reissue of
actually defective applications. 144 The PTO, however, never questioned its
statutory authority to adopt the new rule. In the PTO's view, its authority
was "believed to exist" in 35 U.S.C. § 251 because the new rule was not
literally inconsistent with the existing statute. 145
Another major rule change adopted in 1977 clarified a patent applicant's
duty of disclosure. 146 Prior to the 1977 rule changes, Rule 56 permitted the
Office to strike applications "fraudulently filed or in connection with which
any fraud is practiced or attempted" on the PTO. 147 The rule, however,
never defined which acts constituted fraud or when an application was
fraudulently filed. As early as 1945, courts began expounding on the
necessary acts required to commit fraud on the PTO and, in particular, when
and what information must be disclosed during the patent prosecution
process. 148 Not surprisingly, a number of confusing tests emerged in the
years that followed for disclosing information to the PTO. 149 The PTO
amended Rule 56 in 1977 partly in response to this confusion and partly in
response to the definition of "materiality" offered by the U.S. Supreme
138. Today, the patent reissue process allows an applicant to surrender an issued patent
and have the PTO reissue one or more patents for the invention disclosed in the original
patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000); MPEP, supra note 23, § 1401. Typically, patents are
reissued because they are "wholly or partly inoperative or invalid" in some way. See 35
U.S.C. § 251.
139. A "substantial majority" of the comments received by the PTO favored the rule
change. See Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5588 (Jan. 28,
1977).
140. Id.
141. Reissue, Reexamination, Protest and Examination Procedures in Patent Cases, 47
Fed. Reg. 21,746, 21,746 (May 19, 1982).
142. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 5594-95.
143. Id. at 5594 (printing a revised version of 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(4) (1976)).
144. Wamsley, supra note 110, at 515.
145. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 5588.
146. Id. at 5593-94 (printing a revised version of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56).
147. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
148. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945)
(equitably denying a claim of patent infringement due to unclean hands in failing to bring
evidence of fraud and perjury to the attention of the PTO).
149. See generally Irving Kayton et al., Fraud in Patent Procurement: Genuine and
Sham Charges, 43 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1974); John T. Roberts, The Disclosure Duty: Its
Evolution, Scope, and Limitations, 5 APLA Q.J. 154 (1977).
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Court one year earlier in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.,1 50 which related
to false or misleading proxy statements in violation of the Securities
Exchange Act. The PTO borrowed Northway' s "reasonable shareholder"' 51
standard in developing its "reasonable examiner" standard for materiality
determinations in the context of patent applications.152
Thus, under the guise of Rule 56, the Patent Office advanced its own
interpretation of a patent applicant's duty of disclosure, 15 3 which was
largely in line with the Court's holding in Northway.154 For the first time,
the PTO used its rulemaking power to codify its interpretation of a judicial
decision. As a result, the promulgation of Rule 56 in 1977 represented
another important expansion of the PTO's use of its rulemaking power.
3. Repeal of the Dann Amendments
Although the PTO repealed the 1977 no-defect reissue rule in 1982,155
the PTO never indicated that it lacked the power to implement any of the
1977 rules. In fact, the PTO readily dismissed any questions about the
Commissioner's statutory authority to adopt the 1977 rules and instead
reiterated the goals of the new rules: to "improve the quality ... of issued
patents" and "help to maintain strong patent incentives." 156 According to
the PTO, the no-defect reissue rule was repealed because its repeal was
"desirable in light of the implementation of statutory patent reexamination,"
embodied in the new chapter 30 of 35 U.S.C. 157
Even though the PTO has repealed its own rules (such as the Dann
Amendments) in the past, courts are very reluctant to overturn PTO
rulemaking. In fact, there are only a handful of cases that clearly invalidate
a PTO rule. 158 For example, in 1904, the Supreme Court held that PTO
Rule 41, which mandated division of machine and process claims into
150. 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (formulating a standard of materiality under the Securities and
Exchange Commission's false or misleading statements Rule 14a-9).
151. Id. at 449.
152. See Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28,
1977); see also Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (reaffirming that the materiality standard for a determination of inequitable conduct
requires a showing that a reasonable examiner would have considered such prior art
important in deciding whether to allow the patent application).
153. See Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 5593-94.
154. See Northway, 426 U.S. at 449.
155. See Reissue, Reexamination, Protest and Examination Procedures in Patent Cases,
47 Fed. Reg. 21,746 (May 19, 1982). The repeal was effective July 1, 1982. Id. at 21,746.
156. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 5588.
157. Reissue, Reexamination, Protest and Examination Procedures in Patent Cases, 47
Fed. Reg. at 21746.
158. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U.S. 543 (1904) (holding
PTO Rule 41 invalid); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (concluding
that the Commissioner may not stay a reexamination proceeding under PTO Rule 565(b)).
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separate applications, was invalid because it permitted no discretion.' 59
The Court also emphasized the patent statute's superiority over PTO
regulations by holding that "[i]f there is inconsistency between the rules and
statute, the latter must prevail." 160
4. If at First You Do Not Succeed...
The mounting backlog of unexamined patent applications at the PTO did
not develop overnight. In fact, the PTO recognized inflating application
pendency and unsuccessfully attempted to adopt new rules to help reduce
application pendency at least once before in 1998.161 Interestingly, the
1998 proposed rule changes also included a limit on the total number of
claims eligible for examination in a patent application, akin to the new
claim designation rule.162
The PTO gave advance notice of the 1998 proposed rulemaking, which
was entitled "Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals."'1 63 The
notice addressed twenty-one specific topics for proposed rulemaking,
including a proposed topic to revise 37 C.F.R. § 1.75 to limit the total
number of claims examined in a single patent application to forty. 164 The
proposed rule also limited the total number of independent claims165 in a
patent application to six. 166
As with the current rule changes, the PTO attempted to mollify the
impact of the new rules by citing to the small number of applicants that
would be affected by the proposed rules. 167 According to the PTO, it was
"inappropriate to continue to permit the proclivity of a relatively low
number of applicants.., for excessive claim presentation to result in
delays... and unnecessary [application] pendency."' 168 Unlike the new
proposed claim designation rule, however, the claim rule proposed in 1998
emphasized that the limit of the number of claims was for examination in a
single application "at one time." 169 An applicant could file "any number of
continuing applications" (each with a maximum of forty claims) to obtain
159. Steinmetz, 192 U.S. at 563 ("Such a rule ignores the differences which invoke
discretion, and which can alone justify its exercise, and we are of the opinion therefore that
rule 41 is an invalid regulation.").
160. Id. at 565-66.
161. See Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 63 Fed. Reg. 53,498
(proposed Oct. 5, 1998).
162. See id. at 53,506.
163. Id. at 53,498. The PTO's use of the word "business" in the title of these notices is
interesting here, particularly in light of a recent challenge to the government's use of patent
applicant fees to fund programs outside the PTO. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying
text.
164. Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 63 Fed. Reg. at 53,506.
165. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
166. Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 63 Fed. Reg. at 53,506.
167. See id. at 53,506-07.
168. Id. at 53,506.
169. Id.
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broader claim coverage, if desired. 170 The 1998 proposed rule, therefore,
was quite different from the PTO's current proposal, which attempts to
limit both continuing applications and the number of examined claims. 17 1
Sharp opposition to the 1998 proposed limitation on the number of claims
in a patent application ultimately militated against its adoption. 1
72
E. The Effect of the Administrative Procedure Act on PTO Rulemaking
Touted as one of the "greatest inventions of modem government" for its
rulemaking provisions, the Administrative Procedure Act had a dramatic
effect on administrative agencies in the United States. 173 In order to
thoroughly analyze the bounds of the PTO's rulemaking power, it is helpful
to expound on the APA's applicability to the PTO.
1. The Informal Rulemaking Provisions of the APA
Section 553 of the APA 174 governs the primary vehicle for administrative
agencies to promulgate new rules. The process of promulgating rules under
this section is often referred to as "informal" or "notice and comment"
rulemaking as distinguished from "formal" rulemaking, which is governed
by sections 556 and 557 of the APA. 175 In addition to being subject to
petition for amendment and repeal, 176 rules subject to the informal
rulemaking provisions of the APA require notice of the proposed
rulemaking by way of publication in the Federal Register and an
opportunity for "interested persons" to participate in the rulemaking. 177
Agencies often satisfy the participation requirement by accepting and
publishing comments submitted by the public. 178 "After consideration of
the relevant matter presented," the agency must then incorporate a concise
general statement into the rules of their "basis and purpose."' 179
170. Id. at 53,508.
171. See supra Part I.B.
172. For the public comments to the rule changes, see U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
Comments on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/anpr/index.html (last visited Jan.
31, 2007). For notice of the decision not to adopt the claim limit rule, see Changes to
Implement the Patent Business Goals, 64 Fed. Reg. 53,772, 53,775 (Oct. 4, 1999).
173. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Text 142 (3d ed. 1972).
174. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was codified in title 5 of the United States
Code. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000).
175. Formal rulemaking is rulemaking that is "required by statute to be made on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing." See id. § 553(c).
176. See id. § 553(e).
177. Id. § 553(c).
178. For example, PTO notices of proposed rulemaking are regularly published in the
Federal Register. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
179. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
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2. The PTO's Compliance with the APA Rulemaking Provisions
The Patent Office largely "anticipated the problem out of which the
Administrative Procedure Act was born."'180 As Patent Commissioner
Casper W. Ooms noted, "The Patent Office has consistently provided the
applicant before it with a full measure of all the requisites of process that
the Administrative Procedure Act insures." 181 As such, the Patent Office
outwardly changed little in its procedure in direct response to the APA.182
For example, the PTO had already regularly published proposed rule
changes and solicited comments from the interested public prior to the
enactment of the APA.183
3. The Scope of APA Applicability to PTO Rules
Although preliminary drafts of the APA specifically excluded "the work
of the Patent Office"' 8 4 from APA requirements, it is now universally
accepted that the PTO falls under the ambit of the APA as enacted by
Congress. 185 For example, the APA defines an agency as an "authority of
the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject
to review by another agency."' 186 The APA defines a rule as "the whole or a
part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or
describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an
agency."' 87 Surely, these broad definitions encompass the PTO and most,
if not all, of the rules promulgated by the PTO. To eliminate any doubt,
Congress expressly required that all PTO rules made pursuant to the PTO's
statutory rulemaking authority comply with the APA's informal rulemaking
provisions in 1999.188
Courts may overturn agency rules for failing to comply with the informal
rulemaking procedures of the APA. 189 Not all rules, however, are subject
180. Ooms, supra note 132, at 149.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 153.
183. Id.
184. Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 22
(1946).
185. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999) ("[T]he PTO is an 'agency'
subject to the APA's constraints."); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 928
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (analyzing a PTO Notice under the informal rulemaking provisions of the
APA).
186. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2000).
187. Id. § 551(4).
188. The AIPA of 1999 amended the PTO's main rulemaking authority to provide that all
rules adopted by the PTO "shall be made in accordance with section 553 of title 5."
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4712, 113 Stat. 1501
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
189. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding a
codified interim regulation invalid for failing to comply with the notice and comment
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to these provisions. For example, the APA includes an exception for
"interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice."'
190
At least according to one Commissioner of the PTO, "It is extremely
doubtful whether any of the rules formulated [by the PTO]... are other
than 'interpretative rules, general statements of policy, . . . procedure, or
practice." ' 19 1 The language of the PTO's statutory grant of rulemaking
authority would seem to concur. 192  In addition, part 1 of title 37 of the
C.F.R., where the PTO codifies its rules, is entitled "Rules of Practice in
Patent Cases," which would tend to support this conclusion. 193 Due to the
substantive effect1 94 of some PTO rules, however, it is also extremely
doubtful that all of the rules promulgated by the PTO today are exempt
from the APA's informal rulemaking provisions. 19 5  Since the PTO
regularly follows the informal rulemaking provisions of the APA,
196
whether or not the PTO is required to comply with the provisions may be
purely an academic question. As discussed below, however, the
substantive/interpretive rule dichotomy is important, although not
dispositive, in delineating the bounds of the PTO's rulemaking authority.
197
F. The Bounds of the PTO's Rulemaking Authority
Although Congress may have intended to grant the PTO broad
rulemaking power, this power is certainly not absolute. The key limits of
the PTO's rulemaking authority lie in the language of the PTO's
congressional rulemaking grant itself, as well as in the APA's judicial
review provisions. Below, Part I.F. 1 explores some of these limits imposed
provisions of the APA); Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 630 (5th Cir. 2001)
(invalidating a Department of Interior rule for failing to comply with the APA).
190. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
191. Ooms, supra note 132, at 153 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A)).
192. For example, the PTO's statutory rulemaking grant specifies that PTO rules shall
govern the conduct of proceedings." 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A). This language seems akin to
the "general statements of ... procedure" language in the APA's informal rulemaking
exemption, suggesting that at least rules promulgated pursuant to the PTO's statutory grant
of rulemaking authority are exempt from the APA's informal rulemaking provisions. See 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
193. See 37 C.F.R. pt. 1 (2006).
194. There are several tests for determining when a rule is "substantive" or "legislative"
and when a rule is "interpretive." See infra Part I.F. 1.b.ii. Compare, e.g., Shell Offshore Inc.,
238 F.3d at 627-29 (noting that a substantive rule changes existing procedure, whereas an
interpretive rule merely clarifies existing regulation), and Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg,
932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that a rule is substantive when it "effects a
change in existing law or policy"), with New York City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45
F.3d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (observing that a legislative rule "create[s] new law, rights, or
duties, in what amounts to a legislative act" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
195. For an analysis of the exceptions to the APA's informal rulemaking requirements,
see Michelle J. Burke & Thomas G. Field, Jr., Promulgating Requirements for Admission to
Prosecute Patent Applications, 36 IDEA 145, 151-56 (1995).
196. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
197. See infra Part I.F.l.b.ii.
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by the statutory language of the PTO's general rulemaking authority. Part
I.F.2 introduces the bounds of the PTO's rulemaking authority resulting
from the APA's judicial review provisions.
1. The Language of the Statute
a. "Not Inconsistent with Law"
As previously mentioned, 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) limits the PTO's
rulemaking authority to establishing rules "not inconsistent with law."'198
Although commentators and courts have stated that a rule adopted by the
PTO will have the effect of law unless inconsistent with statute, 199 the
PTO's rulemaking authority is actually much more limited. The U.S. Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) confirmed that PTO rules must not
only be consistent with statute, but must also be consistent with established
precedent. 20 0 As noted by Director Herbert C. Wamsley, "The fact that
PTO rules must be consistent with judge-made law as well as statutory law
limits considerably the Commissioner's power to promulgate substantive
rules, because a massive amount of judge-made law exists in the patent and
trademark field. '20 1
The PTO's congressional grant to establish rules in 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) is
therefore much more narrow than it appears at first glance. Since any new
rules adopted by the PTO must comply with both statute and precedent, the
PTO must analyze both the language of the patent statute as well as judicial
interpretations of the statute before adopting new rules; a proposed PTO
rule that appears permissible solely on the face of the statute may infringe
judicial holdings.
b. "Conduct of Proceedings in the Office"
In addition to specifying that PTO rules be "not inconsistent with law,"
the PTO's rulemaking authority also includes several other restrictions for
PTO rules. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) enumerates six
198. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2000).
199. See, e.g., 2 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents 8-9 (Clark Boardman Co.
1971) (1890) (noting that PTO rules are "subordinate to the statutes, and if inconsistent with
them are invalid, but otherwise are of the same obligation as the acts of Congress"); accord
In re Strain, 187 F.2d 737, 741 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (finding that PTO rules "may not be lightly
disregarded, nor.., set aside unless found unreasonable and prejudicial to an inventor's
rights under the statutes"); Land v. Dreyer, 155 F.2d 383, 386 (C.C.P.A. 1946) (holding that
PTO rules, "when not inconsistent with the statutes from which they are derived," control the
procedure in the PTO).
200. See, e.g., In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 945-46 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The court
analyzed Rule 321 (b) as being consistent with both "statutory and case law." Id. at 945.
201. Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaking Power of the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks (pt. 2), 64 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 539, 557 (1982).
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subsections. 20 2 Four of these subsections begin with mandatory "shall"
language, as opposed to permissive "may" language. 20 3 These four clauses
are correctly read as further limiting the broad grant of rulemaking authority
found in 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2). The most important of these "shall"
subsections is subsection (A), which provides that PTO rules established
under this grant of authority "shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the
Office." 2 °4  As previously mentioned, Congress originally intended this
language to restrict PTO rulemaking to matters regarding applicant
interaction with the PTO. 20 5
It is quite difficult, however, to determine how this subsection limits the
PTO's rulemaking authority today. To be sure, the PTO conducts
numerous proceedings. 20 6 The main proceeding in the PTO involves the
back-and-forth process for obtaining a patent, called patent prosecution. 20 7
Other PTO proceedings include the reexamination, reissue, appeal,
interference, and public use proceedings. 20 8 Surely, almost any rule that the
PTO would care to adopt could be considered to govern the conduct of
proceedings in the PTO. Fortunately, the Federal Circuit has provided
202. The six subsections are as follows:
The Office ... may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which-
(A) shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office;
(B) shall be made in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code;
(C) shall facilitate and expedite the processing of patent applications,
particularly those which can be filed, stored, processed, searched, and retrieved
electronically, subject to the provisions of section 122 relating to the confidential
status of applications;
(D) may govern the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before the Office, and may require
them, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, to
show that they are of good moral character and reputation and are possessed of the
necessary qualifications to render to applicants or other persons valuable service,
advice, and assistance in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or
other business before the Office;
(E) shall recognize the public interest in continuing to safeguard broad access to
the United States patent system through the reduced fee structure for small entities
under section 41(h)(1) of this title; and
(F) provide for the development of a performance-based process that includes
quantitative and qualitative measures and standards for evaluating cost-
effectiveness and is consistent with the principles of impartiality and
competitiveness.
35 U.S.C. § 2(b).
203. Subsections (A), (B), (C), and (E) are "shall" clauses; subsection (D) is a "may"
clause; subsection (F) is neither a "shall" nor a "may" clause. See id.
204. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A).
205. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 23, § 2300 (interference proceedings); id. § 2209 (ex
parte reexamination proceedings); id. § 2600 (inter partes reexamination proceedings);
MPEP, supra note 23, § 720 (public use proceedings); id. § 1200 (appeal proceedings).
207. See supra note 23.
208. Reexamination proceedings are authorized by 35 U.S.C. §§ 302 and 311. Reissue
proceedings are authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 251. Appeal proceedings are authorized by 35
U.S.C. § 134. Interference proceedings are authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 135. Public use
proceedings are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.292.
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some guidance as to the appropriate interpretation of this language in regard
to PTO rulemaking.
i. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg
In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, the Federal Circuit weighed in
on the extent of the PTO's rulemaking authority.209 The Federal Circuit
implied that the PTO does not have substantive rulemaking power, noting
that a "substantive declaration . . . does not fall within the usual
interpretation of [conduct of proceedings] statutory language. ' 210 This
stance was contrary to the view of some commentators, who felt that
Congress intended to give the PTO broad power and autonomy to
administer the patent statute.211 The Federal Circuit disagreed, analogizing
the PTO's rulemaking authority to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC's) rulemaking authority found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
12(a). 212 This section granted the EEOC the authority to "issue... suitable
procedural regulations" to carry out the provisions of the equal employment
opportunities statute. 213
After Animal Legal Defense Fund, there was still doubt as to the PTO's
authority to adopt substantive rules. 214 The Federal Circuit put this doubt to
rest in 1996 with an emphatic declaration that the PTO has no substantive
rulemaking authority.215 The court reiterated that "the broadest of the
PTO's rulemaking powers... does NOT grant the Commissioner the
authority to issue substantive rules." 216  The court went on to say that
"Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive
rulemaking power."217 This declaration by the Federal Circuit seemed to
put an end to the confusion regarding the PTO's authority to promulgate
209. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v, Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that
the PTO need not comply with the notice and comment provisions of the APA when issuing
a notice stating that nonhuman living organisms were patentable subject matter).
210. Id. at 930.
211. See, e.g., Wamsley, supra note 201, at 556 ("This broader reading of [the PTO's
rulemaking authority] would be upheld by most courts today. The Commissioner has power
to promulgate rules on matters of substantive patent and trademark law.").
212. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 & n.20 (1976) (confirming that
Congress did not confer upon the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission authority to
promulgate substantive regulations).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a).
214. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 Ohio St.
L.J. 1415, 1453-56, 1453 nn.147-48 (1995) ("Although some commentators have asserted
that the Commissioner's rulemaking authority is limited to issuing interpretive rules, the
exact nature of the Commissioner's rulemaking power is unclear, at best."); id. at 1453.
215. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that a PTO
Final Determination is not entitled to controlling deference because the PTO has no
substantive rulemaking authority).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1550.
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substantive rules. What constitutes a substantive rule, however, is "far from
crystal clear." 2 18
ii. Substantive Versus Interpretive Rules
In Animal Legal Defense Fund, the Federal Circuit distinguished a
"substantive" or legislative rule from an "interpretive" rule at length.2 19
According to the court, a substantive rule must be promulgated pursuant "to
statutory authority ... and implement the statute" it administers. 220 Other
courts have noted that substantive rules are those "affecting individual
rights and obligations" 22 1 or those that "create or destroy ... legal
rights."2 22  In contrast, an interpretive rule merely "clarifies or explains
existing law or regulations" 223 and does not adversely effect an individual's
rights or obligations. Interpretive rules, unlike substantive rules, "do not
have the force of law,"224 but are still entitled to deference from the
courts.
225
Although the above distinctions are helpful, defining an agency rule or
action as "substantive" or "interpretive" is sometimes arduous. 226 A rule
may appear interpretive on its face, while the specific application of the rule
may be substantive. 227 One court even found that an interpretive agency
action "transubstantiated" from interpretive to substantive because of the
specific application of the action. 228
218. New York City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858, 873 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
219. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927-30 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Although
the APA and some courts refer to "interpretative" rules, most courts use the
legislative/interpretive or substantive/interpretive terminology. See id. at 931 (finding a PTO
Notice "interpretative"); New York City Employees' Ret. Sys., 843 F. Supp. at 872 & n.22
(noting the distinction).
220. Animal Legal Def Fund, 932 F.2d at 927 (quoting Cubanski v. Heckler, 781 F.2d
1421, 1426 (9th Cir. 1986)).
221. Cubanski, 781 F.2d at 1426 (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302
(1979)); accord Animal Legal Def Fund, 932 F.2d at 929 ("One must also look for the
adverse effect of that limitation on an individual's rights and obligations.").
222. New York City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1995).
223. Animal Legal Def Fund, 932 F.2d at 927; see also New York City Employees' Ret.
Sys., 45 F.3d at 12; Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
224. New York City Employees 'Ret. Sys., 45 F.3d at 12.
225. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(concluding that "[a]n agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to substantial
deference"). For an analysis of how much deference, see infra Part I.F.2.c.
226. See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (collecting
sources describing the confusion as "tenuous," "fuzzy," "blurred," and "baffling"); see also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 6.4 (2002) (outlining the various tests
for distinguishing between substantive and interpretive rules).
227. For example, an SEC no-action letter is typically considered an interpretive agency
action, but the content of the letter may have some effect on its substantive/interpretive
designation. See, e.g., New York City Employees' Ret. Sys, 45 F.3d at 13 (disagreeing with




Courts have devised several tests for classifying a rule as substantive or
interpretive. For example, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York grouped the relevant considerations into four distinct
categories: "1) the effect of the agency's rule, 2) the agency's authority to
adopt the rule, 3) the agency's method of devising the rule, and 4) the rule's
regulatory history."229  The court noted that no one consideration is
determinative and agreed with the conclusion of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit that the ultimate test is "an extraordinarily case-specific
endeavor." 230
To distinguish a substantive rule from an interpretive rule, the D.C.
Circuit asks whether the rule has or is intended to have "legal effect."'231
According to the court, a rule has legal effect when any of the following
tests are true:
(1) whether in the absence of the rule there would not be an adequate
legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency action to confer
benefits or ensure the performance of duties, (2) whether the agency has
published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations, (3) whether the
agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative authority, or (4)
whether the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule. 232
Still other courts rely on the Attorney General's Manual on the APA,233
which includes the following working definitions:
Substantive rules-rules, other than organizational or procedural under
section 3(a) (1) and (2), issued by an agency pursuant to statutory
authority and which implement the statute, as, for example, the proxy
rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to
section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78 n). Such
rules have the force and effect of law.
Interpretative rules-rules or statements issued by an agency to advise
the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it
administers....
General statements ofpolicy-statements issued by an agency to advise
the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to
exercise a discretionary power.234
229. New York City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858, 873 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
230. Id. at 876 (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
231. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (outlining a test to distinguish between substantive or legislative rules and interpretive
rules); see also Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules
and Policy Statements, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 542 & n.95 (1977).
232. Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112.
233. See Clark, supra note 132.
234. Id. § 4(a), at 30 n.3.
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Regardless of the test or definition used, according to the Federal Circuit,
substantive rulemaking is outside the scope of the PTO's rulemaking
authority. 235 This Note presents a more expansive reading of the PTO's
rulemaking authority in Part III.A.
2. Judicial Review of PTO Actions Under the APA
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "the courts are the final
authorities on issues of statutory construction. They must reject
administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by adjudication
or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that
frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement. '236 To this end, the
APA provides extensive judicial review of "agency action, findings, and
conclusions." 237
Section 706 of the APA provides that a "reviewing court shall ... hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be--(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law ... [or] (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right. '23 8 Thus, section 706
gives reviewing courts several avenues to set aside PTO rules. For
example, this section requires reviewing courts to set aside a PTO rule if the
rule is in excess of statutory authority, or namely, in excess of 35 U.S.C. §
2(b)(2). This section also requires reviewing courts to set aside arbitrary or
capricious PTO rules.
a. Dickinson v. Zurko: The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
Section 706 of the APA applies absent an exception. One such exception
lies in section 559 of the APA. This provision states that the APA "do[es]
not limit or repeal additional requirements ... recognized by law." 239 Thus,
if the law already recognized a standard of judicial review before the
enactment of the APA, this standard of review may preempt the APA's
standard set forth in section 706.
This issue was explored in Dickinson v. Zurko,24 0 where the Supreme
Court held that the appropriate standard for review for PTO fact-finding is
not the clearly erroneous standard, as previously urged by the Federal
235. See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
236. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981); see also
Astra v. Lehman, 71 F.3d 1578, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the plain meaning of the
patent term extension statute). While the interpretation by the PTO of a statute it administers
is entitled to deference, see infra Part I.F.2.c for how much deference.
237. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000). "Agency actions" are defined broadly under the APA to
include "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." Id. § 551(13).
238. Id. § 706.
239. Id. § 559.
240. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
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Circuit,24 1 but rather the "arbitrary and capricious" or "substantial
evidence" standard (a more deferential standard). 242 Although Dickinson
dealt with PTO fact-finding, not rulemaking, because of the dearth of cases
involving judicial review of PTO rulemaking, it is almost certain that a
contrary standard of review for PTO rulemaking was not recognized before
the enactment of the APA. The appropriate standard for judicial review as
applied to PTO rulemaking, therefore, is also the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard.
Defining this standard is difficult. One court noted that the standard must
be applied on a case-by-case basis, analyzing the "sufficiency of an
agency's stated reasons" for reaching its conclusions.243 The Supreme
Court's arbitrary and capricious test is much more lenient, only asking
"whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment."'244
b. The APA "Hard Look" Standard
Section 706 of the APA also states that "the [reviewing] court shall
review the whole record. '245 The Supreme Court held that this provision
requires a reviewing court to "engage in a substantial inquiry" and perform
a "probing, in-depth review." 246 Only after taking a hard look at the PTO's
justification for a new rule can a reviewing court determine if a PTO rule
should be overturned. The Court emphasized, however, that "the ultimate
standard of [agency] review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. '247  Because court
intervention can be highly intrusive to an agency's operations, the reasons
for overturning an agency rule under the APA must be clear and beyond
doubt.
241. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Dickinson,
527 U.S. 150.
242. The Court admits that there is disagreement about which of these APA standards to
apply, but does not distinguish between the two. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 158. In fact, one
court found no distinction. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that the
arbitrary and capricious provision is a "catchall" and that there is no substantial difference
between the two standards). Typically, however, courts have found that the substantial
evidence standard of review "provides for more rigorous scrutiny" than the arbitrary and
capricious standard. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1979); accord
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967) (concluding that a substantial evidence
standard allows for "considerably more generous judicial review").
243. Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the EPA
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in listing a chemical on the Toxic Release Inventory
without further explanation of its departure from agency precedent).
244. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
(reviewing a decision by the Secretary of Transportation to construct a highway through a
public park).
245. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
246. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.
247. Id. at 416.
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c. Chevron Deference
Courts will accord "considerable weight"24 8 to an agency's interpretation
of a statute so long as the interpretation is "reasonable and consistent with
the statutory purpose." 249  As such, reviewing courts generally defer to
agency rules. Not all agency rules, however, are afforded equal deference.
According to the Supreme Court in Chevron, the level of deference depends
on the agency's legislative delegation of rulemaking authority.250  If
Congress has expressly delegated the agency authority to create rules
interpreting a statute, then a reviewing court should give the agency's
interpretations "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute." 2 5 1  If the legislative delegation of
authority is implicit, rather than express, the agency's interpretation of the
statute will be upheld only if reasonable. 2 52
Although the Supreme Court provided deference guidelines for agency
actions in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
it is easy to interpret the guidelines too broadly. For example, in Merck &
Co. v. Kessler, the PTO urged the Federal Circuit to give controlling weight
to a PTO action under the familiar Chevron rubric.2 53 The Federal Circuit
refused to afford the action controlling weight stating that "'only statutory
interpretations by agencies with rulemaking powers deserve substantial
deference."' 254  More specifically, the Federal Circuit stated that only
agencies "authorized ... to promulgate substantive rules under a statute it is
charged with administering" are entitled to Chevron deference. 255 Instead,
the Merck court afforded the PTO action deference resulting from "the
thoroughness... and validity" 256 of the agency's reasoning-a Skidmore-
type deference. 257 Thus, the amount of deference afforded to a PTO rule is
248. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
249. Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843-44; City of Cleveland v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 68 F.3d 1361, 1367
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (affirming a judgment of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission denying
petitioners' applications to suspend antitrust conditions).
250. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 844 ("[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.").
253. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reviewing a PTO
"Final Determination" that held that a patent granted before June 8, 1995 was not entitled to
a restorative patent term extension added to the end of the 20-year patent term).
254. Id. (quoting Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 441 (7th
Cir. 1994)); see also Pierce, supra note 226, § 6.3, at 332.
255. Merck, 80 F.3d at 1549; accord Pierce, supra note 226, § 6.3, at 327 ("[Tjhe
Chevron test does not apply to interpretative rules.").
256. Merck, 80 F.3d at 1550.
257. This is surely a much lower level of deference than Chevron. See Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions
of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular
case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
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rule-specific and depends on whether the rule was a valid exercise of the
PTO's statutory rulemaking authority.
II. THE PTO RULEMAKING DEBATE: DIVERGENT PRIORITIES LEAD TO
CONTRARY CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE PTO's AUTHORITY TO
PROMULGATE THE NEW RULES
This part details the debate surrounding the PTO's statutory authority for
adopting the two proposed rules. On one hand, the PTO claims the new
rules are not literally inconsistent with any provisions of the patent statute
and are necessary to control the mounting backlog of unexamined
applications. 258 On the other hand, the majority of patent applicants feel the
proposed rules go too far, and some even argue that the new rules are
inconsistent with statute, precedent, and clear congressional intent.259
A. The Continuing Application Rule
This section describes the arguments for and against the validity of the
proposed continuing application rule. Part II.A. 1 outlines patent applicants'
contention that the proposed rule is in excess of the PTO's statutory
rulemaking authority. Part II.A.2 details the PTO's counterarguments for
upholding the proposed rule.
1. The Applicants' Offensive: The Continuing Application Rule Is
Inconsistent with Both Statute and Established Precedent
Patent applicants insist that the revised rule would drastically limit the
rights provided to them under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 121, and 365(c) to claim
the benefit of an earlier-filed application.260 According to many patent
applicants, they are virtually stripped of their ability to file continuing
applications and receive continued examination of an application without
meeting a rigorous "could not have been previously submitted" standard-a
standard that would be rarely met. 261 Opponents of the proposed rule insist
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."); Pierce, supra note 226, § 6.3, at
330-31.
258. See infra Part II.A.2, B.2.
259. See infra Part II.A.1, B.1.
260. See, e.g., AIPLA Continuation Comments, supra note 31, at 6.
261. See id.; Letter from E. Anthony Figg, Chair, Am. Bar Ass'n., Section of Intellectual
Prop. Law, to Honorable Jon Dudas, Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. & Dir.
of the U.S. Patent and Trade Office 3 (May 3, 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/fpp-continuation/aba.pdf
(describing the standard as "too stringent and unrealistic"). But see the examples of the rare
situations where the standard would be met in U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, PTO Town
Hall Presentation Materials, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/presentation/
chicagoslidestext.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) [hereinafter Town Hall Presentation].
2134 [Vol. 75
2007] PTO RULEMAKING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
that the PTO has overstepped its authority because the proposed rule
infringes patent applicants' rights guaranteed by the patent statute.262
a. The Clear and Unambiguous Language of 35 U.S.C. § 120
Opponents of the rule contend that the proposed continuing application
rule runs afoul of various statutory provisions that permit an applicant to
claim the benefit of an earlier-filed application. For example, section 120
of the patent statute provides the primary means for filing a continuation
application in the United States.263 This section states that an application
"shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date
of the prior application." 264 The language of sections 121 and 365(c) are
just as clear: An application "shall be entitled" to the benefit of the earlier
filed application. 265 According to opponents of the proposed rule, these
provisions leave no room for qualification. The Supreme Court has stated
that "[a] party seeking a right under the patent statutes may avail himself of
all their provisions .... These are questions not of natural but of purely
statutory right."' 266 By limiting the number of continuing applications, the
PTO has impermissibly denied applicants the statutory right to file
continuing applications under the patent statute in certain circumstances.
Opponents of the proposed rule also cite various canons of statutory
construction to support their position. For example, "[a] fundamental canon
of statutory construction is that ... words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." 267 The plain meaning of the
statutory "shall" language found in sections 120, 121, and 365(c) of the
patent statute, according to opponents of the rule, is correctly construed as
permitting no discretion as to the number of patent applications that may be
filed under these sections; 268 therefore, the proposed rule's refusal to accept
an application complying with the terms of these sections is expressly
contrary to statute.
262. See, e.g., AIPLA Continuation Comments, supra note 31, at 7.
263. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000). The term "continuing application" refers to any
application claiming the benefit of an earlier-filed non-provisional patent application. A
"continuation" application is just one of these types of applications. See supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
264. 35 U.S.C. § 120.
265. 35 U.S.C. §§ 121, 365(c).
266. United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 247 (1897).
267. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (looking to the ordinary meaning of
bribery rather than the narrower common-law meaning in affirming a conviction under the
Travel Act); see also LSI Computer Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 832 F.2d 588,
590 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (analyzing the plain meaning of the word "person" in the Tariff Act of
1930).
268. See, e.g., AIPLA Continuation Comments, supra note 31, at 6-7.
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b. Controlling Precedent
As explained above, rules adopted by the PTO must be consistent with
both statute and precedent. 269 The Supreme Court's holding in Godfrey v.
Eames270 was congruous with a line of CCPA precedent that followed,
suggesting that the PTO has no statutory authority to limit the number of
continuing applications claiming the benefit of an original application. 271
For example, the CCPA found in In re Hogan that the language of
section 120 is "clear and unambiguous" and that there is no room for
discretion on the part of the PTO.272 The PTO must accept an application
filed under section 120 and accord it the filing date of the parent
application. The CCPA also held in a separate case that "under [section
120] of the statute.., there is no statutory basis for fixing an arbitrary limit
to the number of prior applications." 273 According to opponents of the rule,
in light of this CCPA precedent, the PTO will overstep its statutory
authority by adopting the proposed continuing application rule.274
The Federal Circuit has followed the CCPA. In 1989, the court held that
"[i]n our view, § 120 gives to any applicant for a patent complying with its
terms the right to have the benefit of the filing date of an earlier application.
The language is mandatory." 275 It is clear, therefore, that both the Federal
Circuit and its predecessor maintained that applicants have the statutory
right to file continuing applications so long as the applicants meet the other
provisions of the statute.276 Opponents of the rule insist that there is no
room for qualification or discretion when faced with a clear statutory right
such as that provided by section 120.277
Opponents of the rule also argue that the PTO's suggestion of misuse278
of the patent system through unlimited continuing applications is
269. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
270. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 317 (1863); see infra notes 283-86 and accompanying text.
271. See, e.g., In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 603 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding that the written
description requirement should be tested as of the earliest effective filing date in a chain of
continuing patent applications); In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d 253, 258-60 (C.C.P.A. 1968)
(noting that there is no basis for fixing a limit to the number of continuing applications an
applicant may file); see also Transco Products, Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38
F.3d 551, 562 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reversing a district court decision requiring applicants to
update the best mode disclosure when filing a continuing application).
272. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d at 604.
273. In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d at 254.
274. See, e.g., AIPLA Continuation Comments, supra note 31, at 6-7.
275. Racing Strollers Inc. v. Tri Indus. Inc., 878 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
276. Section 120 requires that the continuing application be (1) filed "before the patenting
or abandonment" of the prior application by an inventor or inventors named in the prior
application, (2) be amended to contain a specific reference to the prior application, and (3)
comply with § 112. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000).
277. See, e.g., AIPLA Continuation Comments, supra note 31, at 6-7.
278. See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued
Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. 48, 49 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) ("[A]pplicants have
misused continued examination practice.., in order to simply delay the conclusion of
examination.").
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misguided. 279 Although unlimited continuing application filings have some
undesirable results, 2 80 courts are not reluctant to equitably restrict the
number of continuation applications, particularly when accompanied by a
showing of "misuse of the ... patent system." 28 1 Opponents of the rule
believe that because the courts already have the tools to limit continuing
applications, the PTO's implication that the new continuing application rule
will thwart misuse of the patent system is unfounded and does little to
advance the PTO's justification for adopting the rule.282
c. Congressional Intent
Assuming arguendo that the proposed rule is not literally inconsistent
with statute or precedent, opponents of the proposed rule argue that it is
certainly inconsistent with congressional intent. As noted in commentary
published with the Patent Act of 1952,283 section 120 was codified in
response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Godfrey v. Eames.284 In
Godfrey, the Court held that continuing applications should be considered
"the same transaction, and both as constituting one continuous application,
within the meaning of the law."2 85  Opponents of the new continuing
application rule insist that if Congress intended continuing applications to
be part of the same transaction as the original application, any limit on the
number of continuing applications would be inapposite to Congress's
intention.2 86
Opponents of the proposed rule also present another cogent argument
regarding the intent of Congress. Their most persuasive evidence is a bill
that Congressman Lamar Smith introduced in the House of Representatives
(but was never enacted) called the Patent Reform Act of 2005.287 One
amendment proposed by the Patent Reform Act of 2005 added a new
section 123 to the patent statute that would give the PTO the express
authority to limit the number of continuing applications. 288  More
279. See, e.g., AIPLA Continuation Comments, supra note 31, at 5.
280. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
281. Symbol Tech. Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 422 F.3d 1378,
1385 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (upholding the equitable defense of laches in a patent infringement
suit); see also In re Bogese II, 303 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming a board decision
that an applicant forfeited a patent due to dilatory tactics).
282. See, e.g., AIPLA Continuation Comments, supra note 31, at 6.
283. P. J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off.
Soc'y 161, 192 (1993) (reprinting the commentary from 35 U.S.C.A. (1954)).
284. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 317 (1863).
285. Id. at 326.
286. The commentary published with the Patent Act of 1952 recognized that
"[c]ontinuing applications are utilized in a number of different situations." Federico, supra
note 283, at 194. The commentary, however, is silent as to whether an applicant is entitled
to file an unlimited number of continuing applications. Id.
287. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). For an
analysis of The Patent Reform Act of 2005, see Patent Bill Includes First-Inventor-to-File,
Post-Grant Opposition Procedure Provisions, 70 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. 142 (2005).
288. See Patent Reform Act, H.R. 2795.
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specifically, the new section was entitled "Limitations on continuation
applications" and read, "The Director may by regulation limit the
circumstances under which an application for patent ... may be entitled to
the benefit under section 120 of the filing date of a prior-filed
application." 289
Opponents of the rule argue that if Congress had already authorized the
PTO to limit the number of continuing applications an applicant may file,
then the new section 123 in the Patent Reform Act of 2005 would have
been superfluous. 290 This strongly suggests that, at least in the eyes of the
legislature, the PTO currently has no power to limit continuing applications.
Since Congress did not intend to give the PTO the ability to limit
continuing applications, only a statutory amendment can authorize the PTO
to do so. Some commentators have agreed. 291
The Patent Reform Act of 2005 portended a potential pitfall in limiting
the number of continuing applications-a pitfall that the PTO has failed to
address in the new continuing application rule. Section 123 of the Patent
Reform Act also included a provision for protecting the ability of applicants
to obtain comprehensive patent protection for their inventions.2 92
Immediately after giving the PTO the power to limit continuing
applications, the bill included a provision stating that "[n]o such regulation
may deny applicants an adequate opportunity to obtain claims for any
invention disclosed in an application for patent. ' 293 This provision in the
bill anticipated the main concern of opponents of the PTO's new continuing
application rule: namely, that applicants will not be able to obtain
comprehensive patent protection for their inventions under the new rule.294
2. The PTO's Response: An Expansive View of 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)
In contrast to the view of many patent applicants, the PTO advances an
expansive reading of its rulemaking authority. According to the PTO, the
Office has "the inherent authority" to ensure that applicants do not abuse
the patent system.295 Thus, the PTO sees itself as a quasi-regulatory agency
empowered to adopt rules promoting the good faith of applicants
conducting business with the PTO. The PTO also believes that the new
289. Id. § 8.
290. See, e.g., Letter from N.Y. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n (NYIPLA) to the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office 4-5 (May 3, 2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/fpp-continuation/nyipla.pdf.
291. See, e.g., Lemley & Moore, supra note 93, at 107 ("Limiting the number of
continuations that can be filed may require an act of Congress.").
292. Patent Reform Act, H.R. 2795, § 8.
293. Id.
294. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
295. Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued
Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. 48, 50 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
[Vol. 752138
2007] PTO RULEMAKING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2139
continuing application rule is not literally inconsistent with either statute or
precedent. 296
a. Constructive Versus Actual Limits on the Number of Continuing
Applications
The PTO admits it "is aware of case law which suggests the Office has
no authority to place an absolute limit on the number of... continuing
applications." 297 Nevertheless, the PTO contends that applicants do not
have "an unfettered right" to file an unlimited number of continuing
applications.29 8 Although sections 120, 121, and 365(c) use obligatory
"shall" language rather than the more permissive "may" language, the PTO
sees nothing wrong with limiting the number of continuing applications
filed under these sections.2
99
The PTO clearly distinguishes the proposed continuing application rule
from an attempt to place an absolute bar on continuing applications. 30 0 In
fact, according to the PTO, the new rule places no limit on the number of
continuing applications. 30 1 Rather, the rule merely requires a showing
before an applicant can file additional continuing applications. This
showing would prevent applicants from submitting "unnecessarily delayed
evidence, arguments, or amendments that could have been presented
earlier."302
The PTO also reconciles the proposed continuation rule with the CCPA
and Federal Circuit precedent quite easily. According to the PTO, the
reason why courts have disfavored limiting continuing applications in the
past was because the PTO had not promulgated any rules to that effect
before attempting to limit continuing applications.30 3 In addition, there was
no "adequate notice of, or an opportunity to respond to, the ad hoc limits
imposed. ' 30 4 In the PTO's view, these differences might cause the Federal
Circuit to uphold the new rule today.30 5
b. Drastic Times Callfor Drastic Measures
The PTO's reasons for adopting the new continuing application rule are
clear: Excessive continuing applications have a "crippling effect" on the
296. See infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
297. Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued










305. See id. at 50-51.
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PTO's ability to examine new application filings. 306 If examiner resources
were diverted from examining continuing applications to examining the
backlog of unexamined original applications, the PTO might be able to
control application pendency. The PTO cites statistics which indicate that it
might have examined as many as 35,000 additional original applications if
applicants had not filed any continuing applications. 307
In addition to increasing examination efficiency, the proposed rule would
serve other important purposes. For example, faster examination would
result in a shorter time to issuance, which, in turn, would lead to earlier
public notice of issued patent claims. Earlier public notice of issued claims
helps assure the public that they are aware of the extent of limited
monopoly rights in others as soon as possible.30 8 This awareness may
hasten innovation in the form of improvements and "design-arounds." 30 9
More importantly, according to the PTO, the new rule reduces the
potential of additional claims issuing on the same invention in continuing
applications. 310 This eases public confusion over the true scope of the
claimed invention. For example, the practice of keeping an application
"alive" in a patent family allows an applicant to tailor claims to cover a new
product that is not literally infringing under an issued set of patent
claims.311 Under current PTO practice, an applicant may present new
claims in a continuing application so long as the claims find support in the
originally filed application.312 This practice, according to the PTO, is
hampering examination efficiency and, if left to continue, will hurt
306. Id. at 49.
307. Id. at 50.
308. See Lemley & Moore, supra note 93, at 107 ("Multiple continuations can be harmful
in another way: they confuse the public.").
309. A "design-around" is a deliberate attempt to circumvent the limited monopoly right a
patent affords by implementing the invention so that it does not infringe a patent claim.
Although design-arounds are discouraged by the patent community, they are generally seen
as innovative and encouraged by courts. See Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The
Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 Syracuse L. Rev. 53,
56 (2001) ("The public ... is encouraged to learn from the patent, and to 'design around' it
by modifying the technology disclosed by the patent. This conduct is encouraged because it
advances science by building on and extending patented technology."); see also State Indus.,
Inc. v. A.0. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[Kleeping track of a
competitor's products and designing new and possibly better or cheaper functional
equivalents is the stuff of which competition is made and is supposed to benefit the
consumer.").
310. See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued
Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 50.
311. The practice of amending claims to cover infringing products in the marketplace is
perfectly fair and legal, according to the Federal Circuit. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants,
Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[Tihere is nothing improper,
illegal or inequitable in filing a patent application for the purpose of obtaining a right to
exclude a known competitor's product from the market.").
312. See35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
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applicants and the PTO. 313 The PTO maintains that the new continuing
application rule is a reasonable and justified solution to these problems.
c. 35 U.S.C. § 101
The PTO may even have some statutory support for the proposed
continuing application rule. Patent practitioners are familiar with section
101 of the patent statute as the statutory provision containing the classes of
statutory subject matter. 314 But section 101 also states that an applicant
"may obtain a patent"315 for an invention; thus, section 101 implies that an
applicant is only entitled to a single patent for a single invention. 316 This
reasoning is already the chief justification for the PTO's common terminal
disclaimer practice, 317 which requires an applicant to submit a disclaimer
that dedicates to the public the terminal portion of the full statutory term of
any patent issuing on an application with claims that are "obvious
variations" 318 of the claims of another one of the applicant's applications or
patents. 319
Applying this analysis to the proposed continuing application rule, the
PTO may argue that an applicant is not entitled to an unlimited number of
patents on a single invention under 35 U.S.C. § 101; rather, the statute
entitles an applicant to a single patent containing all the claims directed
toward the applicant's invention. Any additional patents are solely
discretionary.
B. The Claim Designation Rule
This section describes the arguments for and against the validity of the
proposed claim designation rule. Part II.B. 1 argues that the proposed rule is
inconsistent with statute and judicial dicta. Part II.B.2 details the PTO's
counterarguments for upholding the proposed rule.
313. See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued
Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 50 ("[C]urrent continued examination practice and the filing of multiple applications
containing patentably indistinct claims are impairing the Office's ability to examine new
applications without real certainty that these practices effectively advance prosecution,
improve patent quality, or serve the typical applicant or the public.").
314. The four statutory classes of patentable subject matter are process, machine,
manufacture, and composition of matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 101; 1 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum
on Patents § 1.01 (1997).
315. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
316. See, e.g., In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that under
section 101 an inventor is "entitled to a single patent for an invention").
317. A terminal disclaimer is most typically submitted to obviate a non-statutory
obviousness-type double patenting rejection. See MPEP, supra note 23, § 804 (explaining
the differences between statutory and non-statutory double patenting rejections); see also 3A
Chisum, supra note 314, §§ 9.03-.04.
318. In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
319. The terminal disclaimer may disclaim the terminal portion of the term beyond one or
more patents or one or more applications. See id. at 441-42; MPEP, supra note 23, § 804.
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1. The PTO Has Exceeded Its Authority by Failing To Examine
Applications Fully
In addition to raising validity concerns during the enforcement process,
according to opponents of the proposed claim designation rule, ignoring
claims for which search and examination fees have been paid raises serious
statutory concerns. 320 The PTO has an obligation under 35 U.S.C. §§ 131
and 132 to examine a patent application and "the alleged new invention," 321
and whenever a claim is rejected, to notify the applicant of the reasons for
rejection. 322 By failing to examine each and every claim in an application,
the PTO is failing to examine fully an applicant's alleged invention as
required by the statute.
For example, it is common for an applicant to recite broadly the
applicant's invention in the independent claims and recite additional
elements or features of the invention in the dependent claims. 323 It is more
likely that one of the applicant's dependent claims constitutes a patentable
invention than one of the applicant's independent claims because a
dependent claim includes all of the limitations of its respective independent
claim plus some new limitation.324 If the PTO does not initially examine
many of the applicant's dependent claims because the applicant has not
designated them under the new rule, the applicant may lose the opportunity
to receive a patent on the claimed invention, even though some of the
claims in the application were patentable. 325 Designating patentable claims
for initial examination may be a difficult feat for applicants because they
may not know at the time of filing which claims are more likely to meet the
requirements of the patent statute. 326
320. See, e.g., AIPLA Claims Comments, supra note 106, at 4-5.
321. Section 131 reads, in relevant part, "The Director shall cause an examination to be
made of the application and the alleged new invention." 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000).
322. Section 132 requires that "[w]henever, on examination, any claim for a patent is
rejected, or any objection or requirement made, the Director shall notify the applicant
thereof, stating the reasons for such rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such
information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the
prosecution of his application." 35 U.S.C. § 132(a).
323. See generally Faber, supra note 45, § 11.
324. MPEP, supra note 23, § 608.01(n) ("[A] dependent claim is directed to a
combination including everything recited in the base claim and what is recited in the
dependent claim. It is this combination that must be compared with the prior art, exactly as
if it were presented as one independent claim.").
325. For example, a dependent claim adding a limitation not found in the prior art would
be allowable if rewritten in independent form to include all the limitations of its respective
independent base claim and any intervening claims. See MPEP, supra note 23, § 707.070);
see also Letter from the NYIPLA to the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (May 3, 2006),
Cmt. B 1, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/
fpp-claims/nyipla.pdf. *
326. For example, an applicant may not be aware of prior art at the time of filing that
destroys the novelty of one or more of the applicant's claims.
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Moreover, it is expressly the PTO's duty, not the duty of patent
applicants, to examine applications and discover prior art. 327 To be sure,
most applicants believe their inventions, including all of their claims, are
patentable when they file patent applications.328 According to opponents of
the rule, by requiring an ESD, the PTO has impermissibly shifted the
burden of discovering potentially invalidating prior art to the applicant, a
burden that was not contemplated by the patent statute.3 29 For example, it
is well-settled that the patent examiner, not the applicant, bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of unpatentability. 330 In addition,
the PTO is going against judicial dicta suggesting that an applicant should
be allowed to determine the number and scope of claims presented in a
patent application, provided the requisite fees are paid. 331
2. The Examination of Applications Is Squarely Within the PTO's
Discretion
The PTO argues that limiting the number of claims for initial
examination falls within its rulemaking powers. 332 According to the PTO,
the internal mechanics of claim examination clearly govern the "conduct of
proceedings in the Office." 333  In addition, placing limits on claim
examination does not literally conflict with any statute or contradict any
case law. Applications will still be examined in accordance with 35 U.S.C.
§ 131, and applicants will still be notified of claim rejections in accordance
with 35 U.S.C. § 132.
327. See 35 U.S.C. § 131.
328. In fact, a patent applicant is required to submit an oath or declaration that "[s]tate[s]
that the person making the oath or declaration believes the named inventor or inventors to be
the original and first inventor or inventors of the subject matter which is claimed and for
which a patent is sought." 37 C.F.R. § 1.63 (2006).
329. Although actively discovering prior art may not be contemplated by statute, the duty
of disclosure does require applicants to provide the Office with "all information known...
to be material to patentability." Id. § 1.56.
330. See, e.g., In re Hans Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[T]he examiner
bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a
primafacie case of unpatentability. If that burden is met, the burden of coming forward with
evidence or argument shifts to the applicant .... If examination at the initial stage does not
produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to
grant of the patent.").
331. See, e.g., In re Wakefield, 422 F.2d 897, 900 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("[A]n applicant
should be allowed to determine the necessary number and scope of his claims, provided he
pays the required fees and otherwise complies with the statute.").
332. See generally Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1);
Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 63 Fed. Reg. 53,498, 53,507 (Oct. 5,
1998) ("A rule limiting the number of claims in an application is within the PTO's
rulemaking authority .... ).
333. The PTO cites 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) as the authority to adopt the new rule. See
Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. at
67.
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The PTO reminds applicants that after the designated claims are
allowable, all claims will eventually be examined.334  The delayed
examination will not harm applicants so long as they designate patentable
claims for initial examination. Because the applicant is generally in a better
position to understand the novelty of his or her invention, 335 the PTO
argues that it is entirely fair to ask applicants to designate a limited number
of claims for initial examination. 336 After all, applicants are already
required by statute to present claims that "particularly point[] out and
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention." 337
III. DEFINING THE RULEMAKING LINE
As described above, there is confusion over the scope of the PTO's
rulemaking authority. This part offers a reasonable solution to resolve
some of this confusion. Part III.A proposes a framework for distinguishing
between valid and invalid PTO rules. Part III.B applies this framework to
the new continuing application and claim designation rules. Part III.C
advances some policy arguments for not adopting either of the two
proposed rules. Part III.D concludes with some alternatives to adopting the
new rules that might help increase examination efficiency and reduce the
backlog of unexamined applications at the PTO.
A. A Sensible Reading of 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)
Despite broad dicta from the Federal Circuit suggesting that the PTO has
no substantive rulemaking authority, an alternative and more workable
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) would allow the PTO to promulgate
both interpretive and certain substantive rules. Any agency charged with
conducting proceedings should be permitted to adopt rules regulating those
proceedings. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that some agencies, like
the PTO, have the inherent power to establish certain rules and
regulations. 338 Courts should interpret the PTO's rulemaking authority
broadly because Congress intended to enlarge the PTO's power to adopt
rules when it enacted the PTO's rulemaking provision in the Act of 1870
and the Patent Act of 1952. 339 Setting an arbitrary prohibition against
334. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
335. But see supra note 326 and accompanying text.
336. See generally Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61.
337. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
338. For a similar view, see Wamsley, supra note 201, at 555. The PTO seems to agree.
See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Examination
Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48, 50
(proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) ("[T]he Director has the inherent
authority... to ensure that applicants comply [with the general requirement of good faith in
prosecution]."). But see Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The
Commissioner... has no inherent authority, only that which Congress gives.").
339. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
2144 [Vol. 75
2007] PTO RULEMAKING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2145
promulgating substantive rules seems unnecessarily restrictive, particularly
when the PTO's statutory rulemaking authority is arguably silent as to the
PTO's authority to adopt substantive rules.340
An interpretation allowing the PTO to promulgate both interpretive rules
and certain substantive rules is more reasonable, especially considering the
expansive definition of substantive rules offered by some courts. For
example, the PTO regularly codifies its rules in title 37 of the C.F.R.
34 1 It
also expressly invokes its general legislative rulemaking authority when
promulgating new rules. 342 As a result, some courts would presumably
conclude that almost all PTO rules are substantive. 34 3 A more sensible
solution, therefore, would rework the definition of a substantive rule or
permit the PTO to adopt certain substantive rules.
The approach that this Note suggests--one that is also supported by the
plain meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) as well as its legislative history-is to
allow the PTO to promulgate interpretive rules as well as substantive rules
relating exclusively to the "conduct of proceedings" in the PTO.344 In
keeping with the original intention of Congress, all substantive rules
adopted pursuant to the PTO's rulemaking authority should pertain only to
an applicant's interaction with the PTO or the procedure for obtaining a
patent or trademark. 345 If a proposed PTO rule encompasses more than an
applicant's interaction with the PTO or the procedure for obtaining a patent
or trademark, the rule would govern more than the conduct of proceedings
in the PTO and be literally inconsistent with the plain meaning of the PTO's
rulemaking authority.346
A framework for permissible PTO rulemaking must also resolve the
definition of a substantive rule. As shown above, a general-purpose test to
distinguish between substantive rules and interpretive rules is not very
practical. 34 7 Just because the PTO codifies a rule in the C.F.R. or expressly
invokes its legislative rulemaking authority when promulgating a rule
should not necessarily pigeonhole that rule as substantive. Rather, as urged
by the Federal Circuit, a reviewing court should perform a rule-specific
inquiry focusing on the rule's legal effect on the "rights and obligations" of
340. But see supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
342. The notices of proposed rulemaking published in the Federal Register for the two
new rules both expressly indicate the authority for part 1 of title 37 of the C.F.R. as 35
U.S.C. § 2(b)(2). This would seem to support the position that the PTO always invokes its
general grant of statutory rulemaking authority when it codifies rules. See Changes to
Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Examination Practice, and
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. at 58; Changes to
Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61, 67
(proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
343. These two factors were part of the American Mining Congress
substantive/interpretive rule test. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
344. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2000).
345. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
346. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A).
347. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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patent applicants. 34 8 A court should then classify a rule as substantive only
if the rule adversely affects a patent applicant's rights guaranteed by the
patent statute.349 Although it may be difficult to see how a rule relating
exclusively to the PTO's conduct of proceedings could adversely affect a
patent applicant's statutory rights, substantive rules need not be mutually
exclusive with rules governing the conduct of proceedings in the PTO. For
example, as described below, the new continuing application rule is likely a
substantive rule that governs the conduct of proceedings in the PTO.350
Regardless of whether other such substantive rules exist, it is important not
to deprive the PTO of this potential avenue of substantive rulemaking.
Of course, classifying a rule as substantive or interpretive does not end
the permissible rulemaking inquiry. As noted above, all rules adopted by
the PTO must also be consistent with both case law and statute351 and not
be arbitrary or capricious. 352 These restrictions considerably limit the
subject matter available for PTO rulemaking. 353
B. A Hard Look at the Two Proposed Rules
Analyzing the two new rules under the framework presented above, a
reviewing court should find that the new continuing application rule is an
invalid, substantive rule and the new claim designation rule is a valid,
interpretive rule. Although both of the proposed rules are intended to have
"legal effect," only the proposed continuing application rule adversely
affects an applicant's statutory right-namely, the unequivocal right to
continuing applications guaranteed by sections 120, 121, and 365(c) of the
patent statute. 354 This distinction should qualify the continuing application
rule as a substantive rule.
The claim designation rule, however, merely details a new requisite for
examination. 355 Because the PTO will ultimately examine all the claims in
the application and allow them to grant in a patent, an applicant's statutory
right to a patent is not adversely affected.356 In addition, applicants cannot
reasonably contend that the claim designation rule adversely affects any
other rights guaranteed by other sections of the patent statute. A reviewing
court should, therefore, classify the proposed claim designation rule as an
interpretive rule.
348. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
349. See id. at 930 (finding that a PTO Notice does not "adversely 'affect existing rights
and obligations' of patent applicants" (quoting Chriysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302
(1979)).
350. See infra notes 354-66 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 263-77 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 334-37 and accompanying text.
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After classifying a PTO rule as interpretive or substantive, the next
consideration is whether the rule exclusively "govern[s] the conduct of
proceedings in the Office." 357 Rules meeting this requirement are limited to
those regulating aspects of the management and control of the procedure of
PTO proceedings. Some examples may be illuminating: The format and
manner of submitting patent applications and an applicant's duty of
disclosure to the PTO during the prosecution process can be considered part
of the management and control of the procedure of the patent examination
proceeding. A binding declaration of patentable subject matter, however,
would not fall within the "conduct of proceedings" provision because such
a declaration would regulate the substance of the patent examination
proceeding.
Both of the new rules can be construed to govern the "conduct of
proceedings in the Office." For example, the claim designation rule
requires an applicant to designate representative claims for examination
before the PTO will consider the applicant's patent application. 358 This
regulates the management and control of the procedure of the patent
examination process. Similarly, the continuing application rule regulates
the management and control of the procedure of the application filing
process.
The continuing application rule is likely invalid, however, because it is
inconsistent with both statute and case law. 359 As previously discussed, a
PTO rule that is inconsistent with either statute or case law is outside the
scope of the PTO's rulemaking authority, regardless of whether the rule is
substantive or interpretive.360 The PTO even recognizes the inconsistency
with precedent, but justifies the new rule because it does not place an
absolute limit on continuing applications. 361 This view is short-sighted,
however, because the "could not have been previously submitted" standard
is, for almost all purposes, an effective limit to a single continuing
application per original application filing.362 In some cases, the new
continuing application rule can even completely usurp section 120 benefits
from some applicants.
For example, an applicant could not file a single continuation application
under 35 U.S.C. § 120 based on an application where a request for
continued examination has already been filed.36 3 The new rule, therefore,
may eliminate section 120 benefits in some circumstances. This
consequence of the new rule clearly cannot be compatible with Congress'
357. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2000).
358. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
359. See supra Part II.A. L.a.
360. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
361. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
362. But see Town Hall Presentation, supra note 261 (illustrating some examples of when
the standard would be met).
363. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
intention when it enacted section 120. 364 The PTO, therefore, should
receive authority from Congress to limit continuing applications rather than
adopt a rule that has the potential of being overturned.
Because the continuing application rule contravenes the purpose of
section 120 and goes against established precedent, a reviewing court
should find the proposed rule invalid as exceeding the PTO's statutory
rulemaking authority found in 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2). The rule may also be
invalidated under the APA as "an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law" provision365 or the "in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations" provision.366
The proposed claim designation rule, however, is squarely within the
PTO's rulemaking powers because it does not offend established precedent
or statute. 367  Although the PTO does have a statutory obligation to
examine patent applications and notify an applicant of claim rejections, the
patent statute is silent as to the manner of performing these obligations. 368
Thus, Congress has implicitly left the PTO a gap to fill using its rulemaking
powers. 369 Under the Chevron rubric, this rule should not be overturned
unless unreasonable 37 0 -an argument not advanced by opponents of the
rule.
The claim designation rule should also pass muster under the APA. For
example, because the PTO has advanced legitimate efficiency concerns for
the new claim designation rule and considered the "relevant factors," the
rule cannot be said to be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion. 371
The rule, therefore, is likely a valid exercise of the PTO's rulemaking
power.
C. Reality Check: Policy Considerations for Not Adopting the Proposed
Rules
Regardless of whether the new continuing application rule or claim
designation rule is invalid, there are policy reasons for not adopting either
of the two rules. Many small and large technology companies rely heavily
on licensing royalties from patents for continued research and
development. 372 Not only would the new rules drastically reduce the scope
364. See supra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
365. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). Since the language of this provision closely mimics
the language of 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2), the analysis under either of these sections would be
similar. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), with 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A).
366. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).
367. However, opponents of the rule contend the rule offends judicial dicta. See supra
note 331 and accompanying text.
368. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-132.
369. This rule is therefore entitled to substantial deference. See supra notes 250-52 and
accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
371. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
372. See, e.g., Neil M. Goodman, Patent Licensee Standing and the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 186, 207-09 (1983).
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of patent protection for technology companies-deincentivizing
innovation-but independent inventors would be adversely affected as well.
Independent inventors, who are entitled to prosecute patent applications pro
se, often have extremely limited resources and little patent prosecution
experience. If the PTO gives these applicants only "four bites"'373 at
obtaining a patent, then pro se applicants may not invest the time and
money in the patent application process for fear of not being able to obtain a
patent at all.
In addition, even an experienced patent practitioner typically attempts to
explain a complicated invention to a patent examiner several times before
the examiner fully comprehends the novelty of the invention. By setting a
limit on the number of continuing applications and requests for continued
examination, many patent applicants will be unable to come to an
agreement with the examiner on the patentability of an application's claims,
especially if the novelty lies in a dependent claim that was not designated
for initial examination. 374 This result may cause applicants to seek alternate
forms of protection, including trade secrets,375 which add little or nothing to
the wealth of public knowledge. 376 As such, a reduction in the number of
applicants seeking patent protection may stifle innovation and the free flow
of ingenuity and creativity.
Moreover, the PTO encourages early disclosure of new applications, yet
the reality is that many new products take over ten years, if not longer, to
fully develop and commercialize. 377 During this time, the utility of the
product may change. Because patent applicants are entitled to receive
claims covering new applications of their inventions, 378 it is unreasonable
to limit applicants to a single continuing application. 379
The reality is that the prosecution of a patent application is an extremely
complex endeavor. Patent applicants and practitioners monitor court
decisions closely. Judicially created doctrines, such as the doctrine of claim
differentiation 380 and prosecution history estoppel,38l have an effect on the
373. The applicant would receive two bites in the original application filing and another
two bites after the sole permitted continuing application or request for continued
examination filing. See supra Part I.B. 1.
374. See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
376. See generally 2 Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 8.02 (1967); Michael
P. Simpson, Future of Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism-An
Age-Old Tale, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 1121 (2005).
377. See Cutland, supra note 103.
378. The new claims must be supported by the original disclosure, however. See
generally 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
379. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
380. See, e.g., Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed. Cir.
1987) ("There is presumed to be a difference in meaning and scope when different words or
phrases are used in separate claims.").
381. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727
(2002) ("When the patentee responds to the rejection by narrowing his claims, this
prosecution history estops him from later arguing that the subject matter covered by the
original, broader claim was nothing more than an equivalent.").
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number of applications filed for a particular invention and the type and
number of claims presented in each application. For example, after the
Supreme Court's decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co.,382 applicants who seek comprehensive patent protection
often file multiple applications with claims of varying scope. 383 The PTO,
therefore, should permit applicants to choose the desired level of patent
protection.
D. Effective Alternatives to the New Rules
The PTO is in the position to reduce the growing backlog of pending
applications without needing to adopt drastic rules. The most direct way to
reduce patent application pendency is to hire more patent examiners.
Although hiring more examiners may require an increase in patent
application fees,384 the result would be a corps of examiners that might
begin to chip away at the growing mound of unexamined patent
applications. Fortunately, the PTO has pledged to hire at least 1200 new
examiners each year through 2012;385 however, many challenges relating to
examiner attrition and low morale remain.386 The PTO should focus its
efforts on hiring, training, and retaining competent, happy, and productive
examiners.
The PTO could also offer increased incentives, such as filing discounts,
for electronic correspondence with the Office. The electronic filing
system3 87 facilitates initial processing and application screening, reducing
application intake time. Faster correspondence intake may reduce patent
pendency by putting amendments and responses to Office Actions in the
hands of patent examiners sooner.
Another alternative to adopting the new rules would be to lobby
Congress for another increase in patent application filing fees. 388
Increasing fees has an impact on the number of applications filed and the
number of claims filed per application. For example, the PTO's FY 2006
Performance and Accountability Report noted that the PTO did not meet
382. Id.
383. See Faber, supra note 45, § 60.
384. Patent application filing fees are set by statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(1) (2000).
Other patent fees and surcharges are authorized by several statutory provisions. See, e.g., 35
U.S.C. §§ 41, 119, 120, 132(b), 376 (each permitting the PTO to establish various fees and
surcharges); see also FY 2007 Fee Schedule, supra note 56.
385. See Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006, supra note 5, at 60.
386. See Florence Olsen, Patent Examiners Battle Stress: USPTO Struggles with Hiring,
Retention Issues Amid Morale Problems, FCW.com, July 25, 2005,
http://www.fcw.com/article89658-07-25-05-Print (last visited Feb. 27, 2007); see also U.S.
Gov't Accountability Office, Intellectual Property: USPTO Has Made Progress in Hiring
Examiners, But Challenges to Retention Remain 5 (June 2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05720.pdf.
387. See Electronic Filing System Help, supra note 5.
388. The last fee increase was authorized in 2005. See Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, §§ 801-03, 118 Stat. 2809, 2924-30.
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planned fee collections for the year due to a "decrease in the expected
number of claims being filed per application." 389 This drop in the number
of claims presented for examination can be partially attributed to the hefty
$200 surcharge for each independent claim in excess of three and $50
surcharge for each claim in excess of twenty total claims presented in a
patent application.390 If the number of claims in new application filings
remains an intractable problem for the PTO, then increasing filing fees
might help contain unchecked new filings. Even the Patent Public
Advisory Committee of the PTO recognizes that "some applicants.., have
voluntarily reduced initial claims presented" to avoid the filing
surcharge. 391 Another fee increase might further reduce the number of
claims presented for examination, easing the PTO's examination burden.
Together, these alternatives might help the PTO meet its Strategic Plan goal
to control application pendency without the need to adopt new rules that
might limit the ability of applicants to procure comprehensive patent
protection for their inventions.
CONCLUSION
To be sure, many problems will still linger at the PTO regardless of
whether the Office adopts the new continuing application and claim
designation rules. Improving examination efficiency and patent quality
should be a "mutually shared responsibility" of both the PTO and patent
applicants. 392  Adopting radical new rules with questionable validity,
however, is ill-advised and short-sighted, particularly when the new rules
will cause applicants to rethink patent protection. Because of the PTO's
dubious statutory authority to adopt the rules, the PTO should develop an
alternative plan for combating the "workload crisis" at the PTO.
389. See Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006, supra note 5, at 62.
390. These excess claim fees are the fees for non-small entities. See FY 2007 Fee
Schedule, supra note 56.
391. Letter from Rick D. Nydegger, Chair, Patent Pub. Advisory Comm. of the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, to Honorable Jon Dudas, Under Sec'y of Commerce for
Intellectual Prop. 5 n.4 (May 3, 2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/dapp/opla/comments/fppcontinuation/ppac.pdf.
392. Id. at 1.
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